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MANIPULATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE: THE DECISION OF THE ICTY
OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT PROSECUTOR
NOT TO INVESTIGATE NATO BOMBING IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Anthony J. Colangelo*

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the establishment of the International Criminal Court, an in-depth
understanding of how international criminal judicial bodies function proves
essential to United States foreign policy and academic legal evaluation.
With the "war on terrorism" underway, this understanding must come immediately. The reality of present geopolitical relations has consecrated international law as part of national law, including United States law. We
should know what we face.
In her address to the United Nations Security Council on June 2, 2000,
Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), stated that she had decided not to open a criminal investigation into any aspect of NATO's 1999 air campaign against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).' A primary purpose of the investigation would have been to examine civilian casualties resulting from the
campaign as a possible violation of international law. 2 Ms. Del Ponte laid
out the reasoning for the decision not to investigate in the Prosecutor's Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign. 3 Her controversial decision not to
prosecute is tantamount to a judgment of not guilty. Indeed, a decision not
to prosecute here can be as important, or more important, than a judicial decision in terms of licensing a certain degree of civilian death or "collateral
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2003. 1 would like to thank Professor
Anthony A. D'Amato and Professor Douglass Cassel for their suggestions.
I Press Release, U.N. ITCY, Prosecutor's Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign, PR/P.I.S./510e (June 13, 2000); Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor, The Hague, PR/P.I.S./510-e (June 13, 2000)
[hereinafter FinalReport], at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm.
2 FinalReport, supra note 1.
3

Id.
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damage ' 4 and the tactical methodology permitting those casualties under international law.
This Comment's first argument will analyze the Prosecutor's legal reasoning under international law and probe the Office of the Independent Prosecutor's (OIP) choice and evaluation of the evidence under the criteria of the
ICTY Statute. It will criticize Ms. Del Ponte's decision in light of the numerous reports and accusations submitted to the OIP by governmental and
nongovernmental organizations pursuant to the ICTY Statute's directive.
Through an evaluation of these factors, the analysis will attempt to discern
the standard for war crimes that the OIP applied to NATO and thereby answer the question: Did the Prosecutor give NATO a free pass under the international law governing armed conflict? That is, the Comment will first
examine whether the Prosecutor uniformly applied the correct international
legal standards to NATO bombings, whether the OIP ignored or minimized
important evidence, and whether the Prosecutor took a one-sided NATO approach to the evidence. The discussion will then conclude that the OIP failed
to present a convincing legal argument that no investigation was warranted.
The second area of discussion will suggest that even though the evidence
within the control of OIP indicates NATO war crimes violations, therefore
providing grounds for an investigation, the OIP decision not to investigate
may have been correct given the economic and political reality in which the
ICTY was functioning. This Part will illustrate that despite evidence pointing
to NATO violations of international law, the alliance actively implemented a
policy of adherence to international legal norms. After presenting this program of compliance, the section will outline the severe resource restrictions
with which the ICTY and OIP were faced in every decision to investigate, indict, and prosecute, as well as the political influences that accompanied these
problems. The discussion will ultimately conclude that regardless of political
influence, an OIP investigation into NATO conduct would have blocked important investigations and prosecutions involving war crimes atrocities of exceptional magnitude compared to the NATO mistakes-thus legitimating, but
also necessarily limiting, the OIP decision within the ICTY reality.
The Prosecutor was forced to reach a conclusion5 and was faced with
several choices: she could have absolved NATO of war crimes, she could
have investigated and even prosecuted NATO, or she could have taken a
middle of the road approach and condemned NATO without investigating
its actions. She chose the last option.6 And although her decision in the
end was correct, her means in arriving at this decision worked to enfeeble
international criminal law and muddied the prescriptive boundary lines for
prosecuting war crimes regarding innocent civilian death.
4 "Collateral damage" is the commonly used epithet for the unintended loss of civilian
life in armed
conflict.
5 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 2.
6 Id.
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II.BACKGROUND

In mid-1998, acting in response to reports of widespread massacre by
the FRY against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and the mass exodus of Albanians from their homes, the United Nations Security Council ordered
the FRY to stop its assault on civilians. NATO made preparations for a
military air campaign to ensure compliance with the Security Council demand and instigated settlement agreements with the FRY. In March of
1999, after the second of two attempts to reach an agreement with the
FRY had failed, NATO initiated bombings against the FRY forces in
Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia. The NATO bombing campaign was designed to compel the FRY government to agree to stop its policy of ethnic
cleansing. 7 While the United Nations Security Council had not supported
the NATO member-nations' proposal to use armed force to pressure the
FRY government into compliance, NATO maintained that the bombing
demonstrated a "commitment to the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244." 8 However, during the period of
NATO bombing from March to June 1999, the FRY government intensified its program of ethnic cleansing, murdering approximately 3,000 civilians. The NATO bombing itself is estimated to have claimed around 500
civilian lives. 9
Article 18 of the ICTY Statute governs prosecutorial initiatives. It
provides:
The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from Governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The
Prosecutor shall assess the information received or obtained and decide
whether there is sufficient basis to proceed.' °
Pursuant to Article 18.1, numerous governmental and nongovernmental
studies and requests seeking investigation into the legality of NATO's conduct during the bombing campaign have been submitted to the OIP."'
Among these reports are:
7 See A. Mark Weisburd, International Law and the Problem of Evil, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
225, 232 (2001).
8 Press Release, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Statement on the Situation in the Balkans para. 4 (June 7, 2001), available at LEXIS, News Library,
M2PW File.
9 See Summary, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT (Feb.
2000) [hereinafter Civilian Deaths], at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200.htm#P37_987.
10 Final Report, supranote 1, at para. 3 (emphasis added).
I Civilian Deaths, supra note 9; "Collateral Damage" or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the
Laws of War by NA TO During Operation Allied Force, AMNESTY INT'L REPORT 30 (June 2000) [hereinafter CollateralDamage] (describing in detail those instances which provide evidence of NATO war
crimes violations); Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia (White Book) [hereinafter FRY White Book] (same).
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public documents made available by NATO, the US Department of Defense
and the British Ministry of Defence, . . . documents filed by the FRY before
the ICJ [International Court of Justice], a large number of other FRY documents, and also the two volume compilation of the FRY Ministry of Foreign
Affairs entitled NA TO Crimes in Yugoslavia (White Book) ....
12
The Prosecutor's office also examined "various documents submitted by
Human Rights Watch, including a letter sent to the Secretary General of
NATO during the bombing campaign, a paper on NATO's Use of Cluster
Munitions, and a report on Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign," as
well as "an Amnesty International Report entitled 'CollateralDamage' or
Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NA TO During Operation Allied Force."'3 After considering these governmental and NGO reports, the OIP decided not to open an investigation into the legality of
NATO conduct during the Kosovo bombing campaign.14
III.

INTERNATIONAL

LAW:

MEASURING THE CAMPAIGN

NATO's intervention proves hostile toward two fundamental tenets of
international law regarding armed conflict: jus ad bellum (when force may
be used) andjus in bello (how that force may be used). The Prosecutor correctly limited her analysis to issues ofjus in bello, as the ICTY lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate matters of jus ad bellum and because "the
legitimacy of the recourse to force by NATO is a subject before the International Court of Justice."' 5
Despite the Prosecutor's conclusion not to investigate jus in bello violations, some examples of NATO conduct present serious questions under
established norms of international law concerning the methods and policies
utilized by NATO forces during the bombing and the loss of civilian life
that resulted from such usage. Specifically, NATO's choice of weaponry,
system of target selection, and calculus of military advantage versus civilian
casualty have come under heavy criticism. 16
12 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 6.
13 Id.; Civilian Deaths, supra note 9; Collateral Damage, supra note 11; FRY White Book,
supra
note 1I.

13Final Report, supra note I, at para. 6. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), like Human

Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have experienced increased influence in international humanitarian and human rights law. HENRY J. STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 5-10 (1991).
14 FinalReport, supranote 1, at para. 91.
15 Id. at paras. 4, 33.
16 See Michael Mandel et al., Notice of the Existence of Information Concerning Serious Violations of In-

ternational Humanitarian Law Within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal; Request That the Prosecutor Investigate
Named Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Prepare Indictments Against Them
Pursuant to Articles 18.1 and 18.4 of the Tribunal Statute, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/icty.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003); see also Robert M. Hayden, Biased "Justice": Humanrightsism and the International
Criminal Tribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549 (1999).
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Entrenched rules of international law mandate that armed forces take
serious measures to protect against civilian casualties. These rules are set
forth in a comprehensive manner in Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 under the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts. 17 Although Protocol I, adopted in 1977, has not been
signed by three NATO members, France, Turkey, and the United States, the
Protocol has become incorporated into the body of customary international
law. 8 As part of customary international law,' 9 the rules set out in this Protocol are binding upon all States, and even nonsignatories, such as the
United States, fully recognize their obligations under its criteria concerning
loss of civilian life in armed conflict.20 In fact, NATO assessed the success
of the Kosovo mission in large part according to the Protocol'sjus in bello
criteria of proportionality and discrimination relating to noncombatant immunity.2' Moreover, Article 3 of the ICTY Statute governing the Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction establishes jurisdiction over violations of
the laws or customs of war embodied in the Additional Protocol 1.22
Article 48 to Protocol I outlines the cardinal international law doctrine
23
requiring combatants to distinguish between military targets and civilians.
Article 51(2) additionally warns that "[t]he civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack." 24 Further, Article 52(2) considers "military objectives" to be "those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
'25
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
17 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
18 Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 42; see also Report of the Expert Group To Conduct a Re-

view of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. A/54/634 para. 161 (1999) [hereinafter
Expert Report].
19 In order to constitute customary international law, the custom must have taken hold through (1)
state practice and (2) opiniojuris, or "because [the custom] is believed to be binding." J.L. BRIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 51-52 (6th ed.

1963).
20 Yoram Dinstein, The Thirteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in InternationalLaw, 166 MIL. L.
REV. 93,93 (2000).
21 William Joseph Buckley, The Strength of an Argument: A Response to General Clark'sEssay, in
Kosovo: CONTENDING VOICES ON BALKAN INTERVENTIONS 256 (William Joseph Buckley ed., 2000).
22 Michael J. Keegan & Daryl A. Mundis, Legal Requirementsfor Indictments, in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 123 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001).
23 Protocol1,supra note 17, at art. 48. Article 48 states: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives." Id.
24 Id. at art. 51.
25 Id. at art. 52.
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The Protocol does not restrict its language to direct attacks on civilians.
Rather, it looks to ensure civilian safety by forbidding indiscriminate attacks as well. Article 51(4) defines such illegitimate attacks to be "of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction. '26 Article 51(5)(a) further articulates an indiscriminate attack
as "[a]n attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military
objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar
27
concentration of civilians or civilian objects.
Just as important, however, is Article 51(5)(b)'s reference to another
fundamental principle of the international law governing armed conflict and
the prevention of civilian loss of life: the principle of proportionality. Under this principle, civilian casualties must not outweigh the military objective or advantage obtained through the attack. According to the Protocol,
an attack would violate this principle if the attack "may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.'28 This rule under
Protocol I requires military command to engage in a calculation of the pos29
sible loss of civilian life.

According to Article 85 of Protocol 1, a violation of the principles relating to protection of civilian life constitutes a "grave breach" of international law and is therefore considered a war crime. 30
To ensure
implementation of international law tenets protecting civilian life, the Protocol constructs a high precautionary standard for combatants to obey. 31
Article 57 provides that "[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. '3 2 The Article then goes on to state, in detail that:
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection
but are military objectives ....
26 ld. at art. 51.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391,

391 (1993) (relating the Protocol I to the Gulf War); Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 143, 150-51 (1999).
30 See Protocol I, supra note 17, at art. 85.
31 Lieutenant Commander Stuart Walters Belt, JAGC, USN, Missiles over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex
Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L.

REV. 115, 134 (2000).
32 Protocol I, supra note 17, at art. 57.
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(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii)... ;
(b) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(c) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks33which may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
In fact, reflecting the language of the Protocol, the OIP states that Article 3
of the ICTY Statute requires commanders:
a) to do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
military objectives,
b) to take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and means of
warfare with a view to avoiding or, in any event to minimizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage, and
to cause disproporc) to refrain from launching attacks which may be expected
34
tionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
Not surprisingly, reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the FRY White Book Report present scathing
evidence of NATO war crimes during the bombing. 35 Perhaps more interesting, however, is Amnesty International's official statement concluding
that "NATO forces violated the laws of war leading to cases of unlawful
killing of civilians during the Kosovo conflict. ' '36 Also, in its report Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Human Rights Watch ambivalently
stated: "In its investigation Human Rights Watch has found no evidence of
war crimes. The investigation did conclude that NATO violated international humanitarian law." 37 Human Rights Watch later stated:
33 Id.
34 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 28.
35 NA TO Crimes Against Civilians and CivilianInfrastructure in the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yugoslav Daily Survey, available at http://www.voz-cebelde.de/ipan38.htm;
Civilian Victims andDevastation in NA TO Aggression on Yugoslavia, Serbiainfo (Apr. 23, 1999), available
at http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-04/23/11210.html. This Comment will not rely solely upon the
FRY White Book in any aspect of its discussion. The credibility of the FRY report has been called into
question. See TIM JUDAH, Kosovo: WAR AND REVENGE 259 (2000) (stating that the book is of limited
value in terms of the historical record because of its "selective use of facts").
36 Press Release, New Amnesty International Report Says NATO Committed War Crime During
Kosovo Conflict (June 6, 2000) (emphasis added), available at http://www.amnesty.org.
37 See Civilian Deaths,supra note 9. International humanitarian law is the law of armed combat designed to humanize war. This type of international law can be distinguished from international human
rights law, which deals with the relations between State governments and their citizens.
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We found that 500 civilians were killed and 90 targets were selected
inappropriately because they were civilian targets. We concluded that these
incidents, which violated the laws of war, did not, however, rise to the more
serious level 38of "grave breaches" or war crimes that the tribunal is empowered
to prosecute.
Despite these reports, Ms. Del Ponte declined to investigate. Her decision
led international jurists to charge Ms. Del Ponte with flagrant partisanship
and to condemn her decision not to open an investigation as "an inexcus' 39
able failure ...irreparably discrediting the work of your tribunal [ICTY].
In evaluating potential criminal conduct in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, the OIP committee maintains that it has universally applied the
same criteria to all parties. The OIP outlined these criteria in its report:
a. Are the prohibitions alleged sufficiently well-established as violations of international humanitarian law to form the basis of a prosecution, and does the
application of the law to the particular facts reasonably suggest that a violation
of these prohibitions may have occurred? And
b. Upon the reasoned evaluation of the information by the committee, is the information credible and does it tend to show that crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal may have been committed by individuals during the NATO
bombing campaign?4"
With regard to the following analysis, it is important to keep in mind that
neither the Prosecutor nor the Tribunal had taken a conservative legal view
of these criteria when bringing an indictment before the question of a
NATO investigation surfaced.4' In fact, members of the ICTY Legal Officers have maintained that "objections to indictment based upon a disagreement with the facts as alleged in the indictment" do not constitute a valid
defense, and that the ICTY Statute was designed to "account[] for the inevitable variations of proof at trial." 42
IV. THE

LEGITIMACY OF THE LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE FINAL REPORT

The OIP examined the civilian casualties resulting from the NATO attack according to standards of target selection, military objective, and proportionality that are ingrained in customary international law (via Protocol
I) and incorporated into Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.43 Against this customary international legal framework and whatever corollary appeared in
the ICTY Statute, the Prosecutor's report discussed the specific incidents
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 Letter from Michael Mandel to Justice Carla Del Ponte (Mar. 15, 2000), available
at

http://members.nbci.com/yugo-archive/20000318warcrmande.
40 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 5.
41 Keegan & Mundis, supranote 22, at 128-29.

42 Id. at 131-32.
43 FinalReport, supranote 1, at paras. 14-56; see also Expert Report, supranote 18, at
para. 161.
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that it felt were most symptomatic of war crimes violations. This Part will
reexamine those same incidents using the same evidentiary sources that the
OIP relied upon in its analysis. 44 This examination will reveal critical deficiencies in the OIP legal analysis leading to its ultimate conclusion not to
pursue an investigation.
A. The Attack on a CivilianPassengerTrain at the Grdelica Gorge
On April 12, 1999, a NATO aircraft fired two laser-guided bombs at
the railway bridge over the Grdelica Gorge. 45 Both laser-guided bombs hit
a passenger train crossing the bridge. The attack occurred at approximately
11:40 a.m. According to the OIP report, "at least ten people were killed in
this incident. '46 The OIP report recounts how
[a]fter launching the first bomb, the person controlling the weapon, at the last
instant before impact, sighted movement on the bridge. The controller was
unable to dump the bomb at that stage and hit the train, the impact of the bomb
cutting the second of the passenger coaches in half. Realising the bridge was
still intact, the controller picked a second aim point on the bridge at the opposite end from where the train had come and launched the second bomb. In the
meantime the train had slid forward as a result of the original impact and parts
of the train were also hit by the second bomb.47
44 This Part will also mirror the Final Report in the chronological ordering of each particular incident as it appears in the OIP discussion.
45 FinalReport, supra note 1, at para. 58.
46 Id. At the outset, this number itself is curious because both the Human Rights Watch account of
the incident and the FRY White Book Report maintain that around twenty people were killed. Both reports list the names and ages of at least twelve of the casualties, and both note that the charred remains
of at least five other unidentifiable passengers were found. See FRY White Book, supra note I1
("Bridges and Transportation"); Civilian Deaths, supra note 9, at app. A ("Incidents Involving Civilian
Deaths in Operation Allied Force"). For instance, the Human Rights Watch account describes how:
[i]n the evening, a four carriage civilian passenger train (No. 393) traveling the Belgrade to Ristovic line (on the Macedonian border) is hit as it crosses over the Grdelica Klisura gorge (Bistrica)
bridge on the Juzna Morava river near Leskovac in southeastern Serbia, killing twenty. Killed are:
Branimir Stanijanovic (6), Ivan Markovic (26), Ana Markovic (26), Jasmina Veljkovic (28),
Simeon Todorov (31), Zoran Jovanovic (35), Petar Mladenovic (37), Verka Mladenovic (37),
Divna Stanijanovic (41), Vidosav Stanijanovic (45), Radomir Jovanovic (45), and Svetormir
Petkovic (65). Five others' remains are unidentified, and three persons are reported missing. Tanjug reports that about fifty civilian passengers are killed in the attack.
Id.
47 Id. This language is strikingly similar to the NATO explanation of the event which the Final Report quotes immediately after its description "General Wesley Clark, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe and is here reprinted in full:
"[T]his was a case where a pilot was assigned to strike a railroad bridge that is part of the integrated communications supply network in Serbia. He launched his missile from his aircraft that
was many miles away, he was not able to put his eyes on the bridge, it was a remotely directed attack. And as he stared intently at the desired target point on the bridge, and I talked to the team at
Aviano who was directly engaged in this operation, as the pilot stared intently at the desired aim
point on the bridge and worked it, and worked it and worked it, and all of a sudden at the very last
instant with less than a second to go he caught a flash of movement that came into the screen and it
was the train coming in.
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Before beginning a legal analysis of the Grdelica Gorge incident and the
incident of the attack on the Djakovica Convoy which follows, 48 it is essential
to elucidate the OIP's misapplication or nonapplication of the mens rea standard supplied under the ICTY Statute for war crimes. In the Final Report, the
OIP carefully instructs that in order to establish an unlawful attack under the
ICTY Statute, the mens rea requirement of recklessness must be met, and Article 3 established the test against which such recklessness would be measured. 49 The OIP Report's focus on mens rea, however, proves problematic
for two reasons. First, it is unclear to what extent the Prosecutor actually integrated a mens rea requirement into its deliberations of what indictments to
pursue. Evidence suggests that the mens rea requirement enjoyed little or no
clout in ICTY evaluations of whether indictments were sound.50 That is, the
Trial Chambers did not consider a lack of mens rea evidence an impediment
to pursuing an indictment.5 ' Second, it appears that the OIP Report continually misapplied the mens rea standard of recklessness by transposing an inconsistent, and indeed, more difficult-to-prove standard of deliberateness in
its place with regard to NATO conduct. 52 This subpart will deal primarily
with the latter problem.
Accepting that the bridge was a legitimate military objective, two important issues surface regarding the attack. The first issue is why NATO
had no knowledge of, and failed to detect the civilian passenger train that

Unfortunately he couldn't dump the bomb at that point, it was locked, it was going into the target
and it was an unfortunate incident which he, and the crew, and all of us very much regret. We certainly don't want to do collateral damage.
The mission was to take out the bridge. He realised when it had happened that he had not hit the bridge,
but what he had hit was the train. He had another aim point on the bridge, it was a relatively long bridge
and he believed he still had to accomplish his mission, the pilot circled back around. He put his aim
point on the other end of the bridge from where the train had come, by the time the bomb got close to the
bridge it was covered with smoke and clouds and at the last minute again in an uncanny accident, the
train had slid forward from the original impact and parts of the train had moved across the bridge, and so
that by striking the other end ofthe bridge he actually caused additional damage to the train."
Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 59 (quoting Press Conference, NATO HQ, Brussels (Apr. 13)
[hereinafter Press Conference, NATO HQ, Brussels)).
48 See infra Part IV.B.
49 Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 10.
50 For instance, one Legal Officer in the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor has written that
[i]n the course of rendering their decisions with regard to the form of indictments, the Trial Chambers have also determined what are not appropriate defence objections to the form of the indictment. Principal among those are objections to the indictment based upon ... assertions that mens
rea must be proven in order to establish the existence of a reasonable suspicion.
Keegan & Mundis, supra, note 22, at 131-32.
51 Id.
52 Although the standard of "deliberateness" proves inconsistent with the recklessness standard set
forth in paragraph 10 of the Final Report, the deliberateness standard could be understood as "willfulness": the mens rea standard that the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I utilizes. Protocol 1,
supra note 17. Indeed, it is mysterious that the OIP chose to use recklessness instead of the customary
willfulness standard. And, despite the author's efforts, he could not discover what prompted the OIP's
novel use of the standard in paragraph 10, or from where the recklessness standard even came.
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was approaching the bridge at the time the bombs were launched. 53 The Final Report responds to this question by first asserting that "[i]t does not appear that the train was targeted deliberately."54 However, even though the
mens rea standard relating to protection of civilian life turns on recklessness, not deliberateness, the Report mistakenly builds its analysis of this incident upon the foundation of a deliberateness standard.
The OIP discussion begins by quoting the explanation given by NATO's
Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, General Wesley Clark. Clark insists
that the train appeared "at the very last instant" and too late for the pilot to
dump the bomb. 55 Citing NATO videotape that demonstrated the speed at
which the attack transpired, the Final Report concluded that the period of time
56
in which the person controlling the bomb could have reacted was very short.
Interestingly, the OIP reached this finding over evidence which exposed:
that this video was shown at three times speed, giving the impression to viewers that
the civilian train was moving extremely fast. According to press reports, the United
States Air Force attributed the speeded-up film to a technical fault ... they did not
consider it useful to publicly disclose this information after it was uncovered.57
Here, the OIP relied too heavily on NATO evidence and should have questioned the validity of the tape and NATO's account of the incident through
an investigation.
Nonetheless, assuming the pilot did not have ample time to dump the
bomb before it hit the passenger train, another problem remains. The question of why NATO chose to destroy the bridge in mid-morning, and why it
had no knowledge that there was or would be a passenger train approaching, still stands. NATO surely understood that the pilot would have an extremely limited view and little time to react should a train appear. In fact,
this was essentially NATO's defense. Yet, it appears that NATO took unsatisfactory measures to make sure that unnecessary collateral damage
would not result from the attack. According to Amnesty International,
NATO does not appear to have taken sufficient precautionary measures to ensure
that there was no civilian traffic in the vicinity of the bridge before launching the first
attack. The attacking aircraft-or another aircraft--could have overflown the area to
ascertain that no trains were approaching the bridge. Had it done so, it might have
been able to wait until the train had crossed before launching the attack.58
Under the ICTY Article 3 standard, NATO's failure to take any steps to
protect against civilian loss of life could be considered "reckless" within the
purview of Article 57 of Protocol I, which demands that combatants:
53 Final Report, supra note 1, at paras. 59-62.
54 Id. at para. 59 (emphasis added).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Collateral Damage, supra note 11, at 30.

58 Id. at 33.
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do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects and ... but are military objectives ... [and] take
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a
loss of civilian
view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
59
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
Even more troublesome are the accounts included in the FRY White
Book Report concerning this NATO bombing incident. An official memo
based on eye-witness evidence states: "On April 12, 1999, at about 11:39
a.m., the NATO aggressor launched an attack with three warplanes on the
above mentioned bridges. The first plane flew over the bridges, the second
two missiles hitting the railway bridge and the passenger train on
one fired
it .... - 60 Hence, according to the FRY White Book version, a NATO plane
flew ahead to survey the target and decided to launch the bombs anyway.
Despite evidence presented in both the Amnesty International and FRY
White Book reports pointing to either the reckless or intentional destruction
of civilian life in violation of international norms, the Final Report of the
OIP failed to address the issue of NATO's legal responsibility to take precautionary measures. Rather, the Final Report simply concludes that "[t]he
passenger train was not deliberately targeted. ' '6 1 The OIP thoroughly discards the legal standard it had previously announced in the same report. In
the OIP's own words, Article 3 of the ICTY Statute unequivocally imposes
6
criminal liability when combatants act "recklessly," not deliberately.
NATO's failure to look to see if there was a civilian train approaching a
railway bridge at 11:40 a.m. before firing missiles into the bridge could be
deemed reckless under the OIP's own standard.
The second issue concerns the conduct of the pilot, who, after he had
already bombed the train once, decided to circle around and launch another
bomb hitting the train a second time. The OIP Report cited General Clark's
description of the event in its evaluation of the incident:
The mission was to take out the bridge. He [the pilot] realised when it had happened that he had not hit the bridge, but what he had hit was the train. He had another aim point on the bridge, it was a relatively long bridge and he believed he still
had to accomplish his mission, the pilot circled back around. He put his aim point
on the other end of the bridge from where the train had come, by the time the time
the bomb got close to the bridge it was covered with smoke and clouds and at the
last minute again in an uncanny accident, the train had slid forward from the original impact and parts of the train had moved across the bridge, and so that by strik63
ing the other end of the bridge he actually caused additional damage to the train.
Significantly, in its report, upon which the OIP relied to reach its conclu59 Protocol 1, supra note 17, at art. 57.
60 FRY White Book, supra note II ("Bridges and Transportation").

61 FinalReport, supra note I, at para. 62 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at para. 5.

63 Id. at para. 59 (citing Press Conference, NATO HQ, Brussels, supra note 47) (emphasis added).
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sions, Amnesty International had interpreted this statement not as a legitimate answer for the pilot's conduct, but rather as an inadvertent admission
of guilt. The organization claimed,
NATO's explanation of the bombing-particularly General Clark's account of
the pilot's rationale for continuing the attack after he had hit the trainsuggests that the pilot had understood the mission was to destroy the bridge
regardless of the cost in terms of civilian
casualties. This would violate the
64
rules of distinctionand proportionality.

In other words, that the pilot had full knowledge that a train was on the
bridge, yet proceeded to launch bombs to destroy the bridge in order to fulfill his mission, could constitute a violation of Protocol I Article 57.
The OIP Report even admits that
[t]he committee has divided views concerning the attack with the second bomb in
relation to whether there was an element of recklessness in the conduct of the pilot
....Despite this, the committee is in agreement that, based on the criteria for ini65

tiating an investigation, this incident should not be investigated.

The criteria, which in sum require that the "prohibitions" alleged are sufficiently well established violations of international humanitarian law, and
that the information establishing the "prohibitions" is credible, seem easily
satisfied here. 66 In short, the OIP relied upon the damning Amnesty International report, quoted verbatim NATO statements which evidenced conduct inimical toward a codified rule of international law, and even
proclaimed that the committee itself was divided as to whether the pilot's
conduct was reckless (and therefore in violation of international law), and
still failed to find sufficient evidence to pursue an investigation.67 One
would think that a divided committee would seek to resolve its own internal
divisions through, at least, an investigation into the event in question. As a
legal matter, the OIP decision not to pursue an investigation here was
clearly premature.
B. The Attack on the Djakovica Convoy

In describing the NATO attack on a convoy of civilian refugees near
Djakovica, the OIP Report qualifies its analysis by explaining that the
"facts concerning this incident are difficult to determine," but concludes
that "[t]otal casualty figures seem to converge around 70-75 killed with approximately 100 injured. '68 The OIP Final Report recounts the incident
utilizing the FRY White Book version:
64 Collateral Damage, supra note 11,at 33 (emphasis added).
65

Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 62 (internal citation omitted).

66 Id. at para. 5.

67 Id. at paras. 62-63.
68 Id. at para. 63.
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On April 14, 1999 [...] on the Djakovica-Prizren road, near the villages of
Madanaj and Meja, a convoy of Albanian refugees was targeted three times.
Mostly women, children and old people were in the convoy, returning to their
homes in cars, on tractors and carts. The first assault on the column of over
1000 people took place while they were moving through Meja village. Twelve
persons were killed on that occasion. The people from the convoy scattered
around and tried to find shelter in the nearby houses. But NATO warplanes
launched missiles on those houses as well, killing another 7 persons in the process. The attack continued along the road between [the] villages [of] Meja and
Bistrazin. One tractor with trailer was completely destroyed. Twenty people
out of several of them on the tractor were killed. In the repeated attack on the
refugee vehicles, one more person was killed.69
In the discussion that follows this description, the OIP pays lip service to its
obligation to "[a]ssum[e] the facts most appropriate to a successful [NATO]
prosecution" 70 by assuming, then misweighing, or not weighing at all, the
facts according to the international principles embodied in Article 3 of the
ICTY Statute. First, while the OIP asserts consequential and, indeed, incriminating evidence concerning NATO's conduct during this raid, it
wholly neglects an adequate evaluation of this evidence and effectively circumvents those rules of international humanitarian law it seeks to uphold.7'
Second, the OIP disregards important information presented in both the
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports concerning
72
NATO's failure to meet the accepted standard of military conduct.
Pursuant to Articles 48, 51, and 52 of the Additional Protocol I, international law dictates that combatants must take extensive steps to distinguish between civilian and military targets. 73 International law is so
protective of civilian life that Article 50(3) of the Additional Protocol I goes
so far as to state that "[t]he presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive
the population of its civilian character. '74 Thus, even if the convoy had
been military but had included civilians, NATO could not have legitimately
attacked it without calculating its military advantage versus potential collateral damage. Again, Article 3 of the ICTY Statute unambiguously prescribes recklessness as the standard against which these precautionary
necessities must be measured. 75 Therefore, if NATO was reckless in its
military target assessment and such recklesness resulted in the bombing of a
69 Id.

70 Id. at para. 64.
71 See infra Part 111.
72 Collateral Damage, supra note I1, at 38; Civilian Deaths, supra note 9 ("Refugees on the
Djakovica-Decane Road, Kosovo"); FRY White Book, supra note I I ("Refugee Convoy, Civilian Casu-

alties-A Drastic Example").
73 Protocol I, supra note 17, at arts. 48, 51, 52.

74 Id. at art. 50.
75 Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 5.
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civilian convoy, the aftermath of which left seventy to seventy-five civilians

dead and approximately
one hundred injured, NATO would have breached
76
international law.
The OIP Report notes:

"NATO confirmed that the aircraft had been

flying at an altitude of 15,000 feet (approximately 5 km)and that, in this attack, the pilots had viewed the target with the naked eye rather than remotely ....-77 NATO itself claimed that although the cockpit video showed

the vehicles to look like tractors, when viewed with the naked eye from the
78
attack altitude they appeared to be military vehicles.
NATO's high-altitude bombing technique was roundly criticized as
creating "an asymmetric air campaign [that] routinely gave more weight to
' 79
the protection of Allied military than to that of Yugoslavian civilians.

NATO has presented no explanation that responds adequately to this criticism. 80 Also significant is the fact that the bombings commenced at 11:10

a.m. and continued until approximately 1:00 p.m., constituting almost two
full hours of attack. 81 The OIP Report further notes NATO's doubt during
82
the attack as to whether the convoy was civilian or military in nature.
This doubt eventually led to NATO "suspending attacks until the target
could be verified. '83 In short, NATO pilots made naked-eye evaluations of

a convoy 15,000 feet below them without using other identifying equipment, dropped bombs on the convoy for two hours without really knowing

whether the convoy was civilian or military in nature, and then when doubt
was raised as to the nature of the convoy, suspended the attack. The OIP

Report chose to cite the Human Rights Watch Report here in discussing the
altitude of the NATO bombing and the subsequent decision to halt the at76 Ironically, the refugees that NATO killed in this bombing were precisely those people who
NATO was trying to save: ethnic Albanian refugees. See Collateral Damage, supra note 11,at 35; see
also THE KOSOVO REPORT:

CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 181 (Oxford

Univ. Press 2000) ("The high altitude tactic ... does weaken the claim of humanitarianism to the extent
that it appears to value the lives of the NATO combatants more than those of the civilian population in
Kosovo and Serbia, and especially the lives of the Kosovar Albanians that it was trying to protect.").
77 Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 67.
78 Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 64.
79 Buckley, supra note 21, at 262; see also THE KoSovo REPORT, supra note 76, at 93 (stating that
the NATO 15,000 feet policy "limit[s] pilots' ability to positively establish the military nature of targets.
The large number of decoy targets hit suggests that pilots were not able to make positive visual identification before attacking").
80 According to Buckley, General Clark maintained that: "Risk reduction for noncombatants and
protection of the innocent were put on par with risk assessment for training scenarios for military personnel .... In other words, the ceiling for noncombatant risks was never higher than that for those in
military training. Although meant to convey what extraordinary care was employed in bombing decisions, this claim morally equates risks to noncombatants with those to professional military in training."
Buckley, supra note 21, at 262.
81 Final Report, supra note 1,at paras. 65, 67.
82 Id. at para. 67.
83 Id.
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tack. 84 The Human Rights Watch Report criticized the incident stating,
"[T]he change in NATO rules of engagement indicates that the alliance recognized that it had taken insufficient precautions in mounting this attack, in
not identifying civilians present, and in assuming that the intended targets
were legitimate military objectives rather than in positively identifying
them. '85 Additionally, the OIP Report cites evidence in its possession
pointing to the deliberate NATO bombing of civilians here, but
dismisses
86
this evidence because it is "not confirmed by any other source."
The OIP's conclusion not to pursue an investigation in the face of the
Human Rights Watch argument that the OIP itself had quoted, as well as
the existence of unconfirmed evidence pointing to NATO's criminality, is
inconsistent. Disappointingly, the OIP begins its final analysis of the incident with the same unsatisfying answer that it used in the Grdelica Gorge
incident: "[C]ivilians were not deliberately attacked ....
87 In the next
paragraph, the OIP at least acknowledges the standard of recklessness.
However, the recklessness standard surfaces almost as an afterthought and
suddenly becomes qualified by an unrevealed "degree" requirement that, by
the way, the NATO bombing did not meet. 88 In fact, the OIP neglects to
explicate what "degree of recklessness" is required in terms of the ICTY
Statute or international law. 89 The OIP explanation, or lack thereof, concerning its decision here leaves much to be desired. It is worth quoting
some of the language of the OIP reasoning to drive the point home:
While there is nothing unlawful about operating at a height above Yugoslav air
defences, it is difficult for any aircrew operating an aircraft flying at several
hundred miles an hour and at a substantial height to distinguish between military and civilian vehicles in a convoy. In this case, most of the attacking aircraft were FI 6s with a crew of one person to fly the aircraft and identify the
target. 90
Relying solely upon this OIP language, NATO's military strategy seems at
odds with international law requirements of civilian identification and the
recklessness standard that guards these requirements. 9 1 Amnesty International plainly stated that "[t]he 15,000-feet rule effectively made it impossi84
85

Id. at para. 68.
Id.; see also Civilian Deaths, supra note II ("Refugees on the Djakovica-Decane Road, Kos-

ovo").
86 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 66.

87 Id. at para. 69 (emphasis added).
88 Id. at para. 70.
89 Id.
90 Id. at para. 69.
91 The rationale behind flying above 15,000 feet would be to protect pilots' lives by flying out of the
reach of anti-aircraft artillery. However, because flying at such a height makes it virtually impossible to
discriminate between civilian and military targets in bombing missions, this military strategy implicitly
values the lives of soldiers over those of civilians. Such valuation violates the international law of
armed conflict in this author's opinion.
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ble for NATO aircrew to respect the fundamental rule of distinguishing between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects. '92 The Amnesty
International report supports this proclamation by quoting NATO generals
who maintained that from the flight altitude pilots could not ascertain
whether the targets were civilians. 93 In fact, the only reason the OIP gives
for not pursuing an investigation here is that NATO ceased the bombing
when it became aware of the civilians. 94 That the OIP forwarded this reason is certainly strange given that the Report had only one paragraph earlier
undermined this rationale as a NATO defense by including the Human
Rights Watch opinion. It is enough to read the Amnesty International conclusion concerning whether NATO's halting the attack saved the alliance
from violating international law:
Indeed, according to NATO's own account, the second attack was called off
when the slower aircraft were able to view the site through binoculars-which,
it was implied, the faster bombers could not do. This suggests that NATO operational procedures may well have contributed to an indiscriminate attack, in
breach of internationalhumanitarianlaw. The fact that, in the wake of this

incident, NATO said that it changed operational directives by ordering pilots
to visually ascertain that no civilians are in the vicinity when identifying a target, raises the question of why such95essential precautions were not implemented for the outset of the campaign.
Furthermore, the OIP Report not only insufficiently dealt with the evidence that it did present, suggesting NATO war crimes in the bombing of the
Djakovica convoy, the Report also failed to confront evidence in its possession that further inculpated NATO under international law. One material issue that the OIP Report ignored was the Amnesty International and the FRY
White Book documentation of NATO warplanes not only firing on the convoy, but then firing on the people fleeing the convoy and running into civilian
houses. 96 According to these reports, there were no military vehicles even in
the area. 97 The FRY White Book describes one such example:
Mostly women, children and old people were in the convoy, returning to their
homes in cars, or tractors and carts. The first assault on the column ... took

place while they were moving through Meja village .... The people from the
convoy scattered around and tried to find shelter in nearby houses. But,
missiles on those houses as well, killing ... perNATO warplanes launched
process. 98

sons in the

92 Collateral Damage, supra note I1, at 43.
93 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 69.
94 Id.
95 Collateral Damage, supra note 11, at 43.
96 Id. at 38; see also FRY White Book, supra note II ("Refugee Convoy, Civilian Casualties-A

Drastic Example").
97 See Collateral Damage, supra note 11, at 38.
98 See FRY White Book, supra note 11 ("Refugee Convoy, Civilian Casualties-A Drastic Example").
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It would be reasonable to think that firing missiles into civilian houses
would result in the unnecessary and disproportionate death of civilians.
That NATO did not consider this high probability of collateral damage, or
considered it and proceeded regardless, could substantiate reckless conduct.
Also, the Human Rights Watch report indicates that NATO changed its
story multiple times, first blaming the Serbs for the entire incident, before
finally admitting to the bombing of civilians after coming under intense
media pressure. 99 The Amnesty International report compounds this implication and debunks the legitimacy of NATO's statements by drawing from
eyewitness journalist reports in diametrical opposition to NATO accounts.
For example, the journalist reports suggest that NATO used cluster bombs
and that there was absolutely no military component present in the convoy.100 Amnesty International even invalidated an audio tape, which
NATO had attempted to use as evidence to explain the pilots' perspective in
the bombing, by showing that the tape was not a record of that particular
incident and that NATO was either confused or lying when it relied upon
the tape.' 0
In fact, according to one NATO source: "Some NATO pilots had gone
over and said it was too risky ...another squadron came over. One will err
on the side of caution and the other will be more gung-ho. There are the
airborne and the forward air controllers too. One more gung-ho than the
other." 0 2 While this statement does not support the contention that the
NATO bombing of civilians in this instance was deliberate, it certainly detracts from NATO's position that it was unaware that civilians were present
in the convoy at the outset of the assault. 0 3 This evidence casts a shadow
on the legitimacy of NATO's conduct regarding the bombing, particularly
whether and at what time NATO knew that there were civilians on the
ground, and certainly provides ample basis for ordering an investigation.
The OIP presents an unsatisfying application of international law to the
NATO bombing of the refugees on the Djakovica-Decane Road. This weak
legal reasoning and the OIP's failure to incorporate important evidence in
its possession into this reasoning not only erodes the sense of justice basic
to any independent prosecutorial decision, it also suggests that ulterior motives were at stake in the OIP decision not to pursue an investigation.
99See Civilian Deaths, supra note 9 ("Refugees on the Djakovica-Decane Road, Kosovo"); see also
Collateral Damage, supra note 11,at 33. One large problem for NATO here was that it took the military at least five days to uncover what had actually happened. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea, who was
caught in the unenviable position of changing the story, remarked: "Many believed we'd lost our moral
rectitude." JUDAH, supra note 35, at 261.

10 Collateral Damage, supra note 11,at 34. It is also significant that these journalists, Paul Watson and Robert Fisk, were writing for newspapers based in NATO countries: the Los Angeles Times and
the Independent. Id.
at nn.34-35.
Id. at 36.
102JUDAH, supra note 35, at 260-61. Judah does not identify this NATO source. See id.
103 Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 68.
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C. The Bombing of the RTS (Serbian TV and Radio Station) in Belgrade
Unlike the Attack on the train at the Grdelica Gorge and the refugees
on the Djakovica-Decane Road, NATO's bombing of the RTS central studio in downtown Belgrade, which resulted in the death of ten to seventeen
civilians, was intentional and deliberate. 0 4 Hence, a mens rea evaluation
proves inapplicable here; rather, the only question before the OIP was
whether the deliberate attack on the Serbian Radio Station in the center of
Belgrade violated international law. Without a doubt, this NATO bombing
incident was extremely contentious. It engendered widespread, global criticism'0 5 and evidence demonstrates that it divided the NATO ranks, with
some NATO members objecting to the bombing on the grounds that the
RTS did not constitute a valid military target, and that therefore the attack
violated the Geneva Conventions.0 6 As Amnesty International concluded:
If this information [NATO members' objections] is correct, it empties of all
practical meaning NATO officials' assertion that a target deemed illegal by
one nation would not be reassigned to another member. The case of RTS appears to indicate that NATO's way of dealing with such objections was to
carry on bombing controversial targets
without the participation of members
10 7
who objected to the specific attacks.
In fact, reports have surfaced which describe the U.S. circumventing the
NATO chain of command when operations utilized critical American
weaponry such as Stealth bombers and cruise missiles. 08
The OIP found that despite (1) NATO's admitted motivation for targetId. at para. 71.
105 See NATO's Attack on RTS-Attack on Truth, SERBIA INFO NEWS (Apr. 23, 1999) (statements

104

against the bombing were issued by officials and spokesmen from Russia, Greece, Italy, Switzerland,
Holland, Bulgaria, Timisoara, and China), available at http://www.serbia-info.com/news/199904/23/11206.html.
106 JUDAH, supra note 35, at 266.

Some accounts in the press have suggested that the decision to bomb RTS was made by the US
government over the objections of other NATO members .... "British lawyers [were] arguing that
the Geneva Conventions prohibit the targeting ofjournalists and television stations".... Human
Rights Watch has also reported that an attack on RTS that was to take place on 12 April was postponed due to "French disapproval of the target."
CollateralDamage, supranote 11, at 52.
107 CollateralDamage,supra note 11, at 52.
108 Buckley, supra note 21, at 263 n.21; see also ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC
& INT'L STUDIES, THE LESSONS AND NON-LESSONS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE WAR IN Kosovo 71

(Sept. 29, 1999), at http://www.csis.org/kosovo/lessons.html. Cordesman presents a possible rationale
for this policy: "The U.S., however, flew about 80 percent of all strike sorties and around 90 percent of
all special purpose targeting, intelligence, and electronic sorties. It is the only nation capable of targeting the GPS guided weapons used in bad weather, the use of stealth aircraft, and demanding laser-guided
bomb strikes in urban areas and areas where collateral damage is likely. For security reasons, many
NATO officers cannot enter such U.S. targeting cells." Id. Despite these assertions, it does appear that
the U.S. military command, for the most part, respected the NATO targeting validation process. Id.; see
also JUDAH, supra note 35, at 268-69 (referring to specific instances where the United States commanders would not proceed without French approval).
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ing the RTS may have breached Article 52 of the Additional Protocol 1; (2)
the fact that NATO's failure to warn civilians working in the radio station
may have breached Article 57(2) of the Additional Protocol I; and (3) the
magnitude of civilian casualties outweighed any "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" defeating Additional Protocol I Article 51 (5)(b),
no investigation was begun. This subpart will examine each of these three
events and explain how the OIP erroneously applied international law in its
decision not to pursue an investigation.
According to the OIP Report, NATO sought to justify its attack on the
grounds that the RTS served the dual purpose of military and civilian use.10 9
That is, because the FRY used civilian radio stations to transmit military
messages, and, in NATO's words, civilian television was "heavily dependent on the military command and control system and military traffic is also
routed through the civilian system," the radio stations were legitimate military targets." 0 This view is compatible with international law.'
Nevertheless, as the subpart below will explain, because the measure of civilian
casualties outweighed NATO's actual or anticipated military advantage, the
dual-use defense should not qualify.
Casting aside for the moment the question of dual-use, there is a preliminary aspect of NATO's motivation behind bombing the RTS that hazards a breach of international law: NATO seems to have justified the
bombing as means to disrupt FRY propaganda." 2 The accepted judicial
application of Article 52 of Additional Protocol I forbids belligerents from
rooting an attack on civilians in the goal of destroying the enemy's propaganda mechanism.' " Relying on this application, the OIP Report declares:
"Disrupting government propaganda may help to undermine the morale of
the population and the armed forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian
facility on such grounds alone may not meet the 'effective contribution to
military action' and 'definite military advantage' criteria required by the
Additional Protocols .... ,,14 It is therefore necessary to explore to what
109 Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 72 (quoting NATO Press Conference (Apr. 27, 1999)).
Id.
I10

I

See the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1956) list of acceptable military targets. "The installations of broadcasting and television stations; telephone and telegraph exchanges of
fundamental military importance." COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 635 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].
112 DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS:

KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AFTER-ACTION

REPORT, at A-8 (Jan. 3 I, 2000); see also CORDESMAN, supra note 108, at 60.
113 See CollateralDamage, supra note 11, at 46 (describing why, under Article 52, the NATO at-

tack on the RTS headquarters constituted a "war crime"). The description includes examples from
"[t]he authoritative ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Con-

ventions of 12 August 1949," German Military Manuals, and the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal
not to convict Hans Fritzsche, a Nazi propagandist, as a war criminal. Id.; see also Protocol I, supra
note 17, at art. 52.
114FinalReport, supranote 1, at para. 76.
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end or ends the attack on the RTS was directed.
The Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress
states: "NATO attacked the Serbian state television building in central Belgrade a facility used for propagandapurposes."'"1 5 A reading of the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and even the OIP reports
indicates that the propaganda rationale constituted the actual and underlying
pretense for the NATO attack.1 6 At a press conference after the bombing,
NATO stated that besides disrupting the command relays, the bombing was
designed to "degrade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's propaganda apparatus."1 7 In the language that the OIP chose to quote, NATO elaborated:
[We need to] directly strike at the very central nerve system of Milosevic's regime.
This of course are those assets which are used to plan and direct and to create the
political environment of tolerance in Yugoslavia in which these brutalities can not
only be accepted but even condoned .... Strikes against TV transmitters and

mabroadcast facilities are part of our campaign to dismantle the FRY propaganda
118
chinery which is a vital part of President Milosevic's control mechanism.
The attack could be seen as part of an overall NATO trend aimed at demoralizing the Serbian civilian population, which is a policy that presents prob9
lems under international law. "1
NATO comments further support the contention that propaganda was
the prime impetus behind the attack. For example:
In an interview for a BBC television documentary, UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair reflected on the bombing of RTS and appeared to be hinting that one of
the reasons the station was targeted was because of its video footage of the
human toll of NATO mistakes, such as the bombing of the civilian convoy at
Djakovica, was being re-broadcast by Western media outlets and was thereby
undermining support for the war within the alliance. "This is one of the problems about waging a conflict in a modem communications and news
world ....We are aware that those pictures would come back' 20and there
would be an instinctive sympathy for the victims of the campaign."'
115 DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 112, at A-8 (emphasis added).
116 CollateralDamage, supra note 11, at 45 (quoting Moral Combat-NA TO at War (BBC2 televi-

sion broadcast, Mar. 12, 2000)); Civilian Deaths, supra note 9 ("Serb Radio and Television Headquarters"); FinalReport, supranote 1,at 76.
117 CollateralDamage, supranote 11,at 44.
118FinalReport, supranote 1, at para. 74.
119 JUDAH,

supranote 35, at 256 (validating the accusation of Yugoslav official Zivadin Jovanovic).

They [NATO] said they would make Milosevic and the Yugoslav government bow down in three
days. Then they postponed that to one week and then it was months. So, we saw the targeting of
civilians and our civilian infrastructure. They were targeting refugees, our electricity system, hospitals, schools, refineries, heating systems and they were always expanding the list of civilian targets. Because they realised that they could not win. They were attacking the morale of people to
provoke the suffering of civilians so the government would be obliged to stop its defence.
Id.

120 Collateral Damage, supra note 1I,at 45 (quoting Moral Combat-NATO at War, supra note
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In this vein, Yugoslav Ambassador Vladislav Jovanovic has asserted:
"NATO. needed to cover its crimes and has been engaged in a fierce antiSerb, anti-Yugoslav propaganda campaign whose aim was to cover up the
massive crimes against the civilian population and divert international attention onto other matters, such as the so-called crimes committed by
Yugoslavia's leadership." 121 The United Nations account of the FRY August 12, 1999 Press Briefing describes: "He [Jovanovic] said the destruction of all Yugoslavia's radio and television stations had been one way to
prevent the truth coming out; even satellite broadcasting had been impossible because the satellite centre had been destroyed at the beginning of the
22
war."1
Moreover, the OIP Report itself evinces perhaps an even more convincing argument that the real motivation behind the RTS bombing was the
destruction of FRY propaganda.
In a statement of 8 April 1999, NATO also indicated that the TV studios
would be targeted unless they broadcast 6 hours per day of Western media reports: "If President Milosevic would provide equal time for Western news
broadcasts in its programmes without censorship 3 hours a day between noon
and 1800 and 3 hours a day between 1800 and midnight,
then his TV could be
123
an acceptable instrument of public information."'
According to this statement, had Milosevic allowed for Western reporting
to penetrate the propaganda apparatus of the RTS media, NATO would not
have targeted the radio station and therefore would not have disrupted military communications. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch implied that
bombing in downtown Belgrade was part of a strategy of "psychological
harassment of the civilian population [rather] than for direct military effect."' 24 That is, "[e]ven if one could justify legal attacks on civilian radio
and television, there does not appear to be any justification for attacking urban studios, as opposed to transmitters.' 25 Yugoslav Ambassador Jovanovic pointed out to the U.N. that
116); see CORDESMAN, supra note 108, at 60. The idea that Serbia was using the media as a propaganda
machine was, in fact, a NATO fear. Under a section called "The Problem of Collateral Damage," Cordesman writes:
Serbia made immediate efforts to take advantage of this situation, and collateral damage proved to
be a major problem in terms of world political and media perceptions. It manipulate[d] media
coverage of collateral damage incidents. It provided carefully selected coverage on Serbian television that often failed to provide any evidence that the damage shown had been inflicted by NATO,
or which mixed scenes of real collateral damage with scenes of what seem to have been Serbian
artillary strikes.
Id.
121Press Briefing, United Nations and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Aug. 12, 1999).
122 Id.
123 Final Report, supra note I, at para. 74.
124 Civilian Deaths, supra note 9 ("Serb Radio and Television Headquarters").
125 Id.
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[t]he aim of targeting all those civilian targets was not to diminish or undermine military capacity as claimed ... but to undermine the morale of the civilian population, to deprive it of its basic necessities and needs, to bring it to its
knees and turn it against its own government
and to make it an obedient and
26
docile instrument of NATO's policy.
Thus, evidence suggests that the actual goal of bombing the RTS was, in
fact, to destroy the FRY propaganda and to erode the morale of the Serbian
people. The OIP disappointingly failed27to deal with the conflicts this evidence presents under international law.1
The next international legal issue concerns whether NATO provided
"effective advance warning ...of attacks which may affect the civilian
population" pursuant to Article 57(2) of the Additional Protocol 1.128 The
OIP asserts that "[e]vidence on this point is somewhat contradictory.' ' 29 In
light of the "contradictory" evidence, the Report notes that "it is possible
that casualties among civilians working at the RTS may have been heightened because of NATO's apparent failure to provide clear advance warning
of the attack, as required by Article 57(2)." 130 But, "[o]n the other hand,
'3
foreign media representatives were apparently forewarned of the attack.' '
And, because Western journalists knew there might be an attack, "it would
also appear that some Yugoslav officials may have expected that the build' 32
ing was about to be struck.'
The OIP reasoning, that because NATO warned Western media that
bombings might take place, Yugoslavian officials were supposed to have
known the precise time and location that the RTS was targeted for bombing,
is far-fetched. Amnesty International, for instance, stated: "Amnesty International does not consider the statement against official Serbian media... two weeks before the attack to be an effective warning to civilians,
especially in light of other, contradictory statements by NATO officials and
alliance members."' 33 Furthermore, the OIP's assertions that somehow the
Yugoslavian government's failure to warn its citizens that NATO bombing
126Press Briefing, supra note 121.
127FinalReport, supra note 1,at para. 76.
The committee finds that if the attack on the RTS was justified by reference to its propaganda purpose
alone, its legality might well be questioned by some experts in the field of international humanitarian
law. It appears, however, that NATO's targeting of the RTS building for propaganda purposes was an
incidental (albeit complementary) aim of its primary goal of disabling the Serbian military command and
control system and to destroy the nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosevic in power.
Id.
128 Protocol I, supra note 17, at art. 57, at 1416.
129 Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 77.
130 Id.
131Id.

132 Id. (emphasis added).
133CollateralDamage, supra note 1I,at 52; see also Civilian Deaths, supra note 9 ("Serb Radio and
Television Headquarters") ("When the target was finally hit in the middle of the night ... authorities were
no longer taking threats seriously, given the time that had transpired since the initial warnings.").
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might occur "may suggest that the advance notice given by NATO may
have in fact been sufficient under the circumstances," proves equally dubious.

34

One must keep in mind that OIP was supposedly conducting its

analysis here from the perspective of an objective, independent prosecutor.
The OIP reliance on such attenuated justifications of NATO conduct seriously calls into question the autonomy of the Office and reinforces the assertion that under the surface other factors were at play.
Lastly, the bombing may have breached the rule of proportionality articulated in Additional Protocol I Article 51(5)(b). A military attack violates international humanitarian law if it "may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."'' 35 The OIP cites NATO
statements which demonstrate that the NATO command knew ex ante that
the attack would not effectively disable the military communications and, in
36
fact, broadcasting was only interrupted for three hours.
As noted by General Wesley Clark, NATO "knew when we struck that there
would be alternate means of gettin~g the Serb Television. There's no single
switch to turn off everything but we thought it was a good move to strike it and
the political leadership agreed with us" .....

[A]nother NATO spokesperson

similarly described the dual-use Yugoslav command
and control network as
137
"incapable of being dealt a single knock-out blow."'
Despite the strong evidence that NATO knew it would achieve little or
no military advantage from this bombing, and the OIP findings that "civilian casualties were unfortunately high," the OIP concluded that the casualties "do not appear to be clearly disproportionate" and "recommend[ed] that
the [Office of the Prosecutor] not commence an investigation related to the
bombing of the Serbian TV and Radio Station. ''1 31 The OIP Report qualified this conclusion by clarifying that the proportionality rule does not apply to specific incidents, but rather to the "overall assessment of the totality
of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign."' 139 This
type of cumulative approach, however, has been heavily criticized as being
inconsistent with the language and purpose of the Additional Protocol I and
invalid under current international law.' 40 The International Committee of
134Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 77; see also JUDAH, supra note 35, at 268.
135 Protocol I, supra note 17, at art. 51, at 1413.
136 See FinalReport, supra note 1, at para. 78; Collateral Damage, supra note 11, at 42.
137 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 78.

18 Id. at paras. 77, 79.
139 Id. at para. 52.
140 See Bernard L. Brown, The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare: Recent
Efforts at Codification, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 134, 142 (1976); Gardam, supra note 29, at 407 ("It appears

from the words 'concrete and direct' that the Protocol requires that proportionality be assessed in relation to
each individual attack, rather than on a cumulative basis."); see also Schmitt, supra note 29, at 150.
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the Red Cross Commentary on Protocol I indeed clarifies that the Protocol's
language "was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be
substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appearin the long term should be disregarded.'4 It is difficult to imagine a military attack that, because of
civilian casualties, would breach international law when those particular
casualties are not considered alone, but are instead incorporated into the total number of civilian casualties in the entire combat effort, and then measured against the ultimate military goals of the effort. 142 Because the
ultimate military goals would depend on the subjective evaluation of the
force pursuing those goals, it would appear that the faithful application of
this principle could defeat much, if not all, of international humanitarian
law regarding the protection of civilian life during armed conflict.
Evidence within the control of the OIP demonstrated that (1) NATO's
admitted motivation for targeting the RTS may have conflicted with Article
52 of the Additional Protocol I; (2) NATO's failure to warn civilians working in the radio station may have conflicted with Article 57(2) of the Additional Protocol I; and (3) the magnitude of civilian casualties may have
outweighed the "concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" defeating Additional Protocol I Article 51 (5)(b). The recommendation of the OIP
not to pursue an investigation in light of this evidence rested on an unstable
legal argument, as well as an inadequate evaluation of the facts under international law.
D. The Attack on the Chinese Embassy
At 11:50 p.m. on July 5, 1999, NATO aircraft targeted and hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The attack resulted in the deaths of three Chinese citizens and extensive damage to the embassy and surrounding
buildings. 43 The United States readily admits that this instance came about
because of a mistake in target selection.'
NATO had wrongly identified
the building as the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procure141 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS,

supra note 11l,
at 684 (emphasis added).
142See Johanna McGeary, The Road to Hell, TIME, Apr. 12, 1999, at 36, 36-41 (describing the
damage caused to the civilian population through the NATO "cumulative effect" policy).
143Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 80.
144CORDESMAN, supranote 108, at 62-63. It is also worth noting here that NATO
itself recognized
that extreme measures needed to be taken when targeting densely populated and defended areas.
Whether this works for or against NATO in the Chinese Embassy bombing, however, would be subject
to debate. With regard to the bombing, a NATO Spokesperson said:
The way targeting works, particularly high value targets or a target area that you're going to go in
that has a high threat-the higher the threat, the more value the target, the more time you would
study it .... My feeling would be in an area like Belgrade that's probably the most highly defended area that U.S. forces and NATO forces have flown in, . . . that in an area like that, you're
going to do a lot of study.... I don't know what happened.
Id. at 63.
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ment, which NATO considered a valid military target. 45 The OIP Report
quotes Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering to explain how this mistake occurred:
The bombing resulted from three basic failures. First, the technique used to
locate the intended target-the headquarters of the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP)-was severely flawed. Second, none
of the military or intelligence databases used to verify target information contained the correct location of the Chinese Embassy. Third, nowhere in the target review process was either of the first two mistakes detected. No one who
headquartersmight have known that the targeted building was not the FDSP
46
but was in fact the Chinese Embassy-was ever consulted.1
The OIP Report confirmed this statement by diligently tracing the methodology NATO used in determining target selection and concluded that the
NATO tactics were "inappropriate for use in aerial targeting as they provide
only an approximate location.' 47 The Report then comments on NATO's
decentralized mode of checking the accuracy of the target selection and implies that such a process might ultimately prove ineffective:
Such a circular process did not serve to uncover the original error and highlighted the system's susceptibility to a single point of data base failure. The
critical linchpin for both the error in identification of the building and the failure of the review mechanisms was thus the inadequacy of the supporting data
assumption the information they contained would necbases and the mistaken
14 8
essarily be accurate"'
The Report even mentions evidence that a CIA agent attempted to inform
NATO command on multiple occasions of his doubts as to the accuracy of
the target.' 4 9 NATO's target assessment program conflicted with the Protocol I Article 57(2) requirement that "those who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to spe145 FinalReport, supra note 1, at para. 80.
146 Id. at para. 81; see also Kosovo After-Action Review, Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services
Comm., 106th Cong. (1999). NATO's command structure seems to have presented problems throughout
the campaign. Retired General Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of NATO MC reported: "NATO's
integrated command structure [is] no longer flexible and responsive enough to read quickly and decisively to unforeseen events." Id.
147 FinalReport, supranote 1, at para. 82.
148 Id. at para. 83.
149 Id. at para. 82.

NATO however, maintains that had the agent been able to communicate his

doubt effectively, this would have made no difference in the bombing because the agent thought that the

building was still a valid target, just not the intended target:
He didn't know what the targeted building was, but he didn't think it was the correct building. He,
in fact, thought that the building that was targeted was a valid military target, but he didn't think it
was as high a value target or as lucrative a target as the Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement.
CORDESMAN, supra note 108, at 67.
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cial protection but are military objectives."' 150
Yet, despite what appears to be a violation, the OIP concluded not to
assign responsibility for the mistake to any level of the NATO targeting
process. 15 1 The rationale behind not holding NATO members responsible
seems to be that the target-selection infrastructure was so disorganized and
52
decentralized, that it would be impossible to hold anyone accountable.
Thus, the OIP effectively condones a dangerously incompetent target assessment system. This certainly sends a disturbing message. As Amnesty
International stated:
Although faulty maps and an incomplete database had been blamed for the error,
[NATO Defense Secretary] Cohen stressed that the bombing would continue uninterrupted, even before these resources could be corrected .... NATO was not
taking sufficient safeguards in selecting and vetting targets for attack .... While
not all errors incur legal responsibility under international humanitarian law, all
indications are that the very basic information153needed to prevent this mistake
was publicly and widely available at the time."
In its report, the OIP seemed to wholeheartedly endorse the assertion
that NATO did not take measures sufficient to verify target selection as is
necessary under international law. 154 Hence, the OIP decision not to undertake an investigation because of the very reason for which the target assessment proved deficient-administrative disorganization-evades the
purpose of international law in this context. Indeed, the OIP rationale provides no incentive for military organizations to remedy hazardous defects in
their target-assessment systems; rather, it seems to encourage command decentralization, lack of responsibility and accountability, and uninformed ad
hoc decisionmaking. Such a rationale should not serve as the legal justification not to pursue an investigation.
E.

The Attack on Korisa Village

On May 14, 1999, NATO aircraft dropped ten bombs (four laserguided bombs and six gravity bombs) on the Yugoslav village of Korisa. 5 5
In the Final Report, the OIP immediately announced that "[m]uch confusion
seems to exist about this incident, and factual accounts do not seem to easily tally with each other."' 156 The conflicting nature and scarcity of information ultimately led to the OIP decision not to pursue an investigation in
regard to this NATO bombing incident:
150 Protocol1, supra note 18, at art. 57, at 1416; see also Belt, supra note 32, at 148-49
& n.212.
151 FinalReport, supranote 1, at para. 85.
152 See id.
153 CollateralDamage,supra note 11, at 59-60.
154 See FinalReport, supranote 1, at para. 83.
155 CollateralDamage, supra note I1, at 66; Civilian Deaths, supra note 9 ("Displaced Civilians
in
the Korisa Woods, Kosovo").
156 FinalReport, supranote I, at para. 86.
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The committee is of the view that the credible information available is not sufficient to tend to show that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been
committed by the aircrew or by superiors in the NATO chain of command.
OIP
Based on the information available to it, the committee is of the opinion that
57
should not undertake an investigation concerning the bombing of Korisa.1
The question of whether sufficient information was available to the OIP
complicates the legal analysis of this incident. Here, the OIP might have
very well been justified in not pursuing a prosecution under the ICTY criteria. "58
' However, the lower standard for pursuing an investigation asks "is
the information credible and does it tend to show that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may have been committed by individuals during
the NATO bombing campaign?"' 59 Thus, it will be necessary to look to the
"credible information available" and determine whether there existed sufficient evidence to "tend to show" a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in order to conclude whether the bombing resulted in an excessively
high number of civilian casualties, and hence, signaled a breach of the rule
of proportionality and discrimination.
Like the Chinese embassy bombing, this NATO attack was deliberate.160 Despite NATO's insistence that Korisa was a military target consisting of a military camp and command posts, the bombing killed
approximately eighty-seven civilians, mostly Albanians, and around sixty
were wounded.' 6 1 Again, Articles 48 and 57 of Additional Protocol I protect against the disproportionate killing of civilian life and impose upon
combatants the absolute obligation to take precautionary measures to protect against such casualties. 162 Because of the standards these rules of proportionality and discrimination impose, the excessively high number of
civilian deaths in the Korisa bombing should have engendered OIP skepticism toward NATO action in the evaluation of the incident. 63 It seems the
OIP took the opposite approach.
157 Id. at para. 89 (emphasis added).
158See Keegan & Mundis, supra note 22, at 131-32 (describing what would be valid criteria for an

indictment).
159Final Report, supra note 1,at para. 5 (emphasis added).
160 See id. at para. 88.
161 Id. at paras. 86, 88.
162 Article 57 of Additional Protocol I states, inter alia, that combatants must
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives ...;(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any
event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects; ... [and that] an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated ....
Protocol 1,supra note 17, at art. 57, at 1416.
163 See Gardam, supra note 29, at 391.
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Unlike the Chinese embassy attack in which NATO admitted that an
error had occurred, NATO "continued to affirm the legitimacy of this particular attack" and maintained that "[t]here were never any doubts as to the
validity of the target.' 64 Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International call into question NATO's assertion that Serbian military occupied
Korisa. 65 The Amnesty International Report affirms that there was a Serbian military presence near Korisa, but contends that the presence had been
only temporary (lasting about 10 days) and had disappeared more than a
month before the NATO bombing. 166 This evidence tends to show that
even if NATO had observed a military presence, it had not updated its target assessment to ensure the validity of the target at the time of the attack
and ended up killing a disproportionate number of civilians.
The Yugoslav Government brought in foreign reporters to document
the wreckage immediately after the bombing.
Reporters who visited the scene the day after the attack saw around 30 tractors
still parked in the yard at Korisa, 20 of which had been burnt out. Some questioned whether this could really have been a military target, as it was in an exposed, open field where military hardware could not have been hidden.
According to a Washington Post journalist, reporters at the scene had been unable to confirm either visually or by interviewing refugees that any military installations or personnel had been present that night.'67
To the extent that this account mirrors the description of the scene after the
NATO attack on the civilian refugee convoy near Djakovica discussed
above, 168 the most disturbing aspect implicit in any parallel between the two
instances is that NATO did not appear to alter or upgrade its target assessment methodology to protect against civilian loss of life after the Djakovica
tragedy.
Operating under the assumption that NATO had no knowledge that so
many civilians were present, the NATO identification methods proved inadequate in recognizing such a presence. In the view of an American Navy
Lieutenant,
Article 48 is the cornerstone of customary international law concepts on the
law of war and codified the requirement of distinction. Article 48 begins the
important task of placing on the commander a requirement not only to balance
164FinalReport, supranote 1,at paras. 86, 87, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato
061300.htm; see CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 294 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff

eds., 1999).
165CollateralDamage, supra note 11, at 66; Civilian Deaths, supra note 9 ("Displaced Civilians in
the Korisa Woods, Kosovo").
166CollateralDamage, supranote 11,at 62.
167FRY White Book, supra note II ("Villages"); CollateralDamage, supra note I1,at 66 (referring
to a NATO Press Conference on May 17, 1999); see also Steven Pearlstein, NATO Won't Release
Korisa Evidence, WASH. POST, May 21, 1999, at A26.
168See supraPart IV.B.
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the ambiguities of necessity and proportionality, but also, the enormous obligation of affirmatively taking steps to distinguish the locos (and effect) of his actions. These requirements become a touchstone for the rest of Part IV of

Protocol I on the role of the commander to protect civilians from the vagaries
of war and the impact
of the commander's decisions on the methods and
69
means of warfare. 1
Yet, when asked by a reporter at NATO Headquarters as to the methodology the pilot used in validating the target and whether NATO knew that
there were civilians and tractors on the scene, NATO spokesman Peter
Daniel reacted: "I can't tell you what is on the ground, I'm not on the
ground and you're not on the ground either. I've seen the footage."' 70
Here, Daniel's statement strongly suggests that NATO did not know what
was actually on the ground when it decided to fire the ten missiles and
bombs. Then, when asked whether NATO mistakenly attacked the refugees
and tractors, Daniel responded: "I am telling you ...

we believed this to

be-and do believe this to be-a legitimate military target that was validated according to the pilot prior to launching the strike."'' It is doubtful
that the international laws of proportionality and discrimination would conof sixty others as
sider the death of eighty-seven civilians and the injury
72
part of a legally "validated" military target assault.1
According to NATO, the attack was valid because the pilot who
dropped the first bombs on the target
"had to visually identify [the target] through the attack systems which are in
the aircraft, and you know it was by night, so he did see silhouettes of vehicles
on the ground and .. .it was by prior intelligence a valid173target .... Of

course, and we have to be very fair, we are talking at night."'

This, however, does not provide a legitimate excuse or an affirmative defense under international law regarding the rule of discriminating between
civilian and military targets. 7 4 As one commentator has stated:
NATO took the decision to attack at night with full knowledge of the difficulties this would create in identifying the target and distinguishing civilians. It
was not enough for the pilot to identify silhouettes of vehicles on the ground
and attack on the basis that the presence of vehicles was consistent with prior
intelligence that labeled the area a legitimate military target. .

.

. NATO

should have taken precautions in accordance with Article 57(2) to confirm that
the target remained legitimate and that there were no or few civilians present.
169 Belt, supra note 3 1, at 134.

170 Press Briefing, NATO, Call Me Irresponsible ...The NATO Spokesman on the Korisa Incident,
NATO Headquarters (May 15, 1999).
17 IId.
172See Protocol 1,supranote 17, at arts. 48, 51, 52, at 1412-14.
173FinalReport, supranote I, at para. 88 (quoting General Jertz).
174See Belt, supra note 31, at 134 (describing a commander's obligation under Article 48 of the
Additional Protocol 1).
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Such precautions could have included conducting the attack in daylight, obtaining
updated intelligence about the area, and attacking from a lower alti175
tude.
The only other argument that NATO proposes in response to accusations regarding the high toll of civilian casualties is that Serbs had used civilians as human shields. 176 International law completely prohibits this type
of military tactic. 177 However, as Human Rights Watch emphatically
stated:
[S]uch violations of the laws of war do not in any account release an adversary
from obligations to respect civilian immunity. An authoritative new commentary on humanitarian law states: "If one party to a conflict breaks this rule, this
does not exempt the other side from the regulations applicable in military attacks ....

The military commander must therefore take into account the col78

umn of refugees used by the adversary as a shield."'

Therefore, even if Serb forces had used civilians as human shields this
would not relieve NATO's burden of target verification under international
law. Indeed, the question of target verification would be an entirely separate matter. And, NATO did not adequately verify the target or it would
have been aware of the strong presence of civilian life.
In sum, nothing NATO presents as an explanation for the high civilian
loss of life, be it that the attack occurred at night or that Serbs used refugees
as human shields, absolves NATO from its obligation to adequately verify
military targets and distinguish civilian targets. Moreover, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, FRY White Book, and eyewitness journalist reports indicate, and in some instances proclaim, NATO's failure to have
adequately assessed the Korisa target. 17 9 Such consensus indicates that the
OIP should have approached the incident assuming a war crimes violation.
Yet, the OIP found that there was insufficient credible information available
that would tend to show a breach of international law. 80 This decision can
only be rooted in a one-sided evaluation of evidence in favor of NATO.
Such a superficial evaluation hints that other factors influenced the OIP
conclusions.

175Tania Voon, Note, Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NA TO Bombing in the Kosovo
Conflict, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1083, 1111-12 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
176 CollateralDamage, supra note 11, at 64.
177 See ProtocolI, supra note 17, at art. 51(7), at 1413.

178 Civilian Deaths, supra note 9 ("Displaced Civilians in the Korisa Woods, Kosovo") (quoting
Hans-Peter Gasser, Protectionof the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
INARMED CONFLICTS 505 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/
index.htm.).
179 CollateralDamage, supra note 11, at 67; Civilian Deaths,supra note 9 ("Displaced Civilians in
the Korisa Woods, Kosovo").
180 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 89.
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F. The OIP Catch-All: Imputability and Command Responsibility
As a final catch-all justification, the OIP states that "[i]n all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result
in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high
18
level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous offences."'
On the contrary, the above discussion has demonstrated that the international law is clear and that the OIP failed to accurately apply that law; a
failure which leaves the OIP refusal to investigate for fear of lack of evidence with which to impute liability to specific NATO actors unjustified.
Alternatively, even if the OIP found that the law was uncertain with regard
to something like imputability, at least one important function of the Tribunal consists of clarifying and implementing international standards under its
jurisdiction. The Tribunal has pursued this task without hesitation with regard to command responsibility charges against Serb offenders,' 82 and there
is no reason why such decisionmaking should not apply equally to NATO
actors.
Moreover, just how the OIP concluded that there would be insufficient
evidence deserves scrutiny. Although the OIP relied on NGO, Yugoslav,
and NATO reports, the only entity with readily accessible information concerning specific actors and chain of command responsibility is NATO.
However, as the OIP noted, "when the OTP requested NATO to answer
specific questions about specific incidents, the NATO reply was couched in
general terms and failed to address the specific incidents. The committee
has not spoken to those involved in directing or carrying out the bombing
campaign."'' 83 Thus, the OIP had little information about the specific incidents or the particular actors carrying out those missions, but it did have
evidence that these instances signaled possible war crimes violations.
Wouldn't this lead an independent prosecutor to investigate?
The OIP deficiently applied international legal standards of target selection, military objective, and proportionality in its evaluation of the
NATO conduct that it felt most indicated violations of international law.
Through analytical shortcomings such as misinterpreting the requisite mens
rea standard and a one-sided consideration of information within its control,
the OIP Final Report failed to present a convincing legal argument for not
pursuing an investigation into the civilian casualties that resulted from the
NATO bombing campaign.

181 Id. at para. 90.

182 ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, Celebici Case, Feb. 20, 2001, at paras. 190-98. The Appeals
Chamber looked to customary law to decide the issue of command responsibility in the case, relying
upon precedent, Article 87(3) of Additional Protocol I and the International Criminal Court Statute Article 28. Id.
183 Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 90.
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V. REASONS BELOW THE SURFACE: RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND
POLITICAL DEPENDENCE

This Part will present issues of resource allocation and political dependence of the Tribunal and the OIP as underlying reasons for why the
Prosecutor decided not to pursue an investigation into NATO bombing.
Subpart A will focus on the question of whether an investigation was
feasible, taking into consideration the ICTY's dire resource situation and
the direct political needs stemming from that situation against the backdrop of NATO's policy and methodology throughout the bombing campaign. Subpart B will briefly explore criticisms that the Tribunal was a
purely political organ of NATO, and more specifically of the United
States.
A. Resource Allocation and Its DirectPoliticalConsequences
I would have assumed that NATO committed war crimes under international
law for the purposes of an investigation. However, I would have reached the
same conclusion not to pursue an investigation-but for different reasons. For
resource reasons. If you think about it as a scale from one to ten, where you
have war crimes violations occurring on the level of nine and ten on one side,
as opposed to one and two on the other, and you only have a limited amount of
to go after the side that is committing the nine and ten deresources, you want
184
gree violations.
-Justice Richard J. Goldstone,
Original Independent Prosecutor for the ICTY
Although the OIP fell short in its unconvincing and ultraconservative
view of international law leading to the decision not to pursue investigations into NATO war crimes, the outcome of the decision might have been
justifiable on other grounds. As this Comment has argued, strict and
faithful application of the international legal standards governing protection of civilian life should have resulted in an investigation into NATO
war crimes.' 85 Yet, such a devoted and universal adherence to the rule of
international law in this regard may very well have been impossible given
the political and economic realities under which the OIP and the ICTY
were operating. This subpart will attempt to show that because of inadequate resources and allocation problems, the OIP may have been right in
its decision not to investigate NATO conduct because such an investigation would have subtracted from limited resources needed to pursue more

184

Interview with Justice Richard J. Goldstone, Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa

and Original Independent Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
at Northwestern University School of Law (Oct. 3, 2001).
185 See supra Part IV.
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egregious war crimes violations. 8 6 Moreover, resource dilemmas tended
to fuel the politicization of the Tribunal and the OIP, making an investigation into NATO conduct functionally self-destructive for the ICTY. 18 7

Here it becomes instrumental to recognize that issues of resource allocation and political influence are in no way mutually exclusive within the

ICTY context; rather, one grows more or less directly out of the other.
Yet, that political influence may have impacted the OIP does not taint the
entire ICTY with an air of bias. Prosecutors traditionally enjoy a certain

amount of discretion in whether or not to indict, prosecute and for that
matter, investigate, and political motivations influence these decisions.'8 8
Before continuing, an important point should be made with regard to
the criticism in the Comment thus far. The criticism is, first and foremost,
concentrated on the legal analysis of the OIP. Evidence of certain instances

of NATO conduct needed to be factored into this criticism insofar as such
evidence supported the argument that the OIP fell down on the job-that is,

the job of investigating the conduct or providing a valid explanation for not
pursuing an investigation. Yet, it is equally important to understand that
despite faulty implementation, NATO did infuse international legal standards of noncombatant immunity into its military policy from the inception

of the bombing campaign. 8 9 In obedience to the Protocol's proportionality

requirement, 90 NATO used precision-guided weapons almost exclusively
in instances involving urban areas to protect against civilian casualties, five
times more than were used in Operation Desert Storm by the United
States.' 9' Moreover, NATO had officially listed three elements concerning
its tactical approach to civilian loss of life: "attack only militarily significant targets, [use] extraordinary measures to minimize collateral damage;
[and use the] highest percentage of precision weapon employment in his186For an objective and thorough account of the FRY program of "ethnic cleansing,"
see THE
KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 76, at 88-92.
187The "politicization" referred to here deals with the politics growing out of the ICTY need for resources. The author is of the opinion that this "politicization" can be divorced from criticisms in Part
V.B, infra, which would have the Tribunal created for the purpose of implementing NATO and U.S.
foreign policy.
188See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom.,
Cox v.
Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
189 NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark pointed to "minimal collateral damage [which] required detailed risk analysis and use of precision munitions to avoid injury to innocent
civilians" as one of the "four measures of merit to assure NATO's military actions met its political will."
Buckley, supra note 21, at 261; see also CORDESMAN, supra note 108, at 60 ("NATO made a detailed
effort to review the range of possible collateral damage for each target, and to plan its strikes so that the
weapon used, the angle of approach, and the aim point would minimize collateral damage. This process
was so exhaustive that NATO often had more strike aircraft available than cleared targets, and many
important targets were avoided or sent back for review again and again."); THE KOSOvO REPORT, supra
note 76, at 94, 179-80.
190See Protocol 1,supra note 17, at art. 51, at 1413-14.
191Belt, supra note 31, at 134.
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tory." 192 The Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress guaranteed that
[d]uring the course of the campaign, NATO developed mechanisms for delegating target approval authority to military commanders. For selected categories of targets-for example, targets in downtown Belgrade, in Montenegro, or
targets likely to involve high collateral damage-NATO reserved approval for
higher political authorities .... Legal reviews of selected targets were conducted at successive echelons of the chain of command. Targets nominated
for approval .. .received legal reviews in the field. Targets nominated that
met the criteria requiring ... approval received detailed legal scrutiny by the
Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the DOD
General Counsel. Legal reviews involved evaluation of certain targets as valid
military targets as valid military targets as governed by applicableprinciples
of the laws and customs of armed conflict.' 93
According to one source, all targets were approved by a military lawyer,
who,
[s]itting at his computer screen, would assess the targets in terms of the Geneva Conventions governing the laws of war. He would rule whether its value
outweighed the potential costs in collateral damage. A military lawyer also
standard" to the fine line separating military
applied the "reasonable-person
94
and civilian targets. 1
NATO's attitude and methodology here are significant. While this approach to military planning does not exculpate NATO from any violations
that might or might not have occurred during the bombing campaign, it
does signal the alliance's programmatic concentration on the international
law governing collateral damage. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo has asserted, "the NATO campaign was more careful, in relation to its targeting, than was any previous occasion of major warfare
conducted from the air. This care with targeting was partly an expression of
declared policy, and it reflected the availability of 'smart' technology that
had the capacity to be precise."' 95
In a world of unlimited resources where the OIP and the ICTY would
be able to conduct contemporaneous investigations and prosecutions into
each and every deserving instance of war crimes, NATO's policy and precautionary measures might not enjoy much weight if the actual bombings
indicated violations. However, this world was not the one in which the OIP

192Buckley, supranote 21, at 261 n. 16.
193 DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 112 (emphasis added). General Clark also affirmed that "the political

oversight of the more sensitive targets ensured that governments would support these decisions and rally
public opinion." Buckley, supra note 21, at 263.
194 Michael Ignatieff, The Virtual Commander: How NA TO Invented a New Kind of War, NEW

YORKER, Aug. 2, 1999, at 30, 33-34.
195THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 76, at 179-80.
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and ICTY were functioning. 9 6 Resource allocation and supply constituted
essential elements to any OIP and ICTY decision. 97 The bottom line is that
NATO did not intentionally violate the laws of war; rather, the alliance was
conscious of these legal standards and took measures, although sometimes
inadequate, to adhere to them. This NATO course of action rightly shaped
the O1P decision with regard to the administration of very limited resources.
In reality, the OIP faced two crucial questions in relation to NATO's
conduct and whether the evidence warranted opening an investigation.
First, did the evidence sufficiently point to a violation of international law
guaranteeing an indictment? Second, and perhaps more importantly, to
what extent was pursuing an investigation here an efficient use of limited
resources under the circumstances in which the OIP and ICTY were functioning?
To be sure, the OIP could have pursued an investigation only if the
evidence evinced sufficient probability of obtaining an indictment. However, the special jurisdiction of the ICTY provided remarkable flexibility in
this area. 98 As one Legal Officer in the OIP has commented:
All of the [ICTY Trial Courts] ...have decided that the basic requirement
for a sufficient indictment, as set forth in the ICTY Statute and Rules, is a concise statement of the facts and of the crime or crimes with which the accused is
charged....
...While stating clearly that there was a "minimum level of information
that must be provided by the indictment" in order for the indictment to be
"valid as to its form", [sic] the Trial Chamber held that "as a general rule, the
degree of particularity required in indictments before the International Tribunal is different from, and perhaps not as high as, the particularity required in
domestic criminal law jurisdictions."' 199
Thus, the Tribunal's construction of the ICTY Statute afforded the OIP unusual latitude in pursuing an indictment in order to ensure the prosecution
of violations, and therefore, an indictment against NATO would most likely
have been available to the OIP had it pursued investigations into NATO

conduct.
196See Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunals,
94 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 760 (2000); see also Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia Comes ofAge: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH.U.
J.L. & POL'Y 87, 92 (2001) (referring to "scarce resources" as one of the major problems of the ICTY).
197 Expert Report, supra note 18, at para. 9.

198The way that the indictment process works under Article 19 of the ICTY Statute is that "when an
indictment is presented by the Prosecutor it must, before an arrest warrant is issued, be confirmed by a
member of the Trial Chamber who is satisfied that a prima facie case has been established by the Prosecutor. This has been interpreted to mean that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
has committed the crimes alleged." Id. at para. 42.
199 Keegan & Mundis, supra note 22, at 127-29.
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The second, more discreet, but perhaps more consequential question
concerning efficient resource allocation, however, requires a more complicated analysis. Despite the availability of indictments, the economic and
political reality of the ICTY demands that when the OIP submits an indict200
The reament for confirmation to the Tribunal, the case is "trial ready."
son for this trial readiness is that the OIP must be almost certain of a
conviction. Because of time and money restraints, the OIP and the ICTY in
general simply cannot afford to try cases unless there is (1) a very high
chance of conviction and (2) the defendant must also be a protagonist of the
most egregious degree of war crime activity. 20' The OIP is aware of this
and is therefore exceedingly discriminating in the cases it chooses to investigate and prosecute.2 0 2 Because of this selective approach and the economic and political reasons underlying the approach, an OIP investigation
into NATO would have been a misallocation of resources and ultimately
harmful toward primary objectives of the ICTY, such as ensuring the prosecution and conviction of the major war crimes perpetrators in the former
Yugoslavia. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo has reported that:
over 90% of the Kosovar Albanian population were displaced from their
homes.
• ..[V]irtually all of those displaced were forced from their homes by
members of the Yugoslav armed forces, Serbian police or paramilitary units, in
a process routinely preceded by shelling, and subsequently accompanied by
abuse, extortion, and killings...
. .[T]he number of killings [is] in the neighborhood of 10,000 with 2the
03
vast majority of the victims being Kosovar Albanians killed by FRY forces.
*

When faced with the question of into what investigation20 4 resources would
go, the OIP correctly gave FRY investigations precedent.
To better understand this discriminatory policy and the resource pres-

200 Expert Report, supranote 18, at para. 155.
201 Id. at paras. 65, 94-97. Section 1, entitled "Leadership Cases" outlines the OIP policy of going
after only leaders, or higher level officials as opposed to low-level soldiers etc. The section argues that
this type of policy is not only cost-effective, but communicates an important political message and re-

mains consistent with UN Security Council objectives. Id.
202 Id.at para. 125.
The number of complaints is so great and involves so many widespread geographic areas and individuals that it is physically impossible for the investigations staff to deal with all of them .... A
process of selection is inevitable . . . the Office of the Prosecutor has attempted to focus on the
most egregious and pervasive violence against civilians by the various ethnic groups involved in
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
Id.

203 THE Kosovo REPORT, supranote 76, at 90-91.

204 Expert Report, supranote 18, at para. 125; see Wald, supranote 196, at 96.
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sures placed on the OIP, it will be useful to briefly illustrate the grave resource problems that the ICTY in general, and the OIP in particular, encounter. It is telling that the ICTY's inefficient resource use led to the
establishment and mandate of an Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the
Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(Expert Report) under United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
53/212 and 53/213 on December 18, 1998.205 The UN mandate devotes one
section of review exclusively to the OIP, which expressly encompasses "the
optimum use of investigation personnel. ' 20 6 Still, the setup of the Tribunals
in general presented complicated resource problems. 20 7 For instance, the
ICTY Statute had to be amended to add more Trial Chambers (from two to
20 8
three), and until May of 1998, only one courtroom had been available.
Moreover, adjudicating cases consumed tremendous resources resulting in
prolonged pretrial detentions such that, by the time the Expert Group Report was issued, "after almost seven years and expenditures totalling $400
million, only 15 ICTY and ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda] have been completed."209 Of the fifteen completed trials, eight
were in the ICTY, seven persons in custody were convicted, and one was
acquitted. 210 This resource exhaustion is a result of many factors particular
to the working of an International Criminal Tribunal, such as the overwhelming amount of evidence needed to resolve "knotty" legal issues, pretrial delays, the ongoing need for translation, and obtaining indicted persons
for court appearance. 21 Furthermore, all those who had been convicted appealed. 21 2 The number of indictments was and is continually rising, such
that the Trial Chambers has predicted that the ICTY would not finish its
task until the unacceptable date 2016.213
Despite having a comparatively substantial budget in relation to the
other ICTY departments, resource shortage problems plague the OIP specifically as well. 214 The legal complexity of establishing guilt beyond a rea205 Id. at paras. 1-13. The mandate itself states: "The Expert Group shall prepare an evaluation of

the functioning and operation of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ...

with the ob-

jective of enhancing the efficient use of the resources allocated to the Tribunals." Id. at para. 4.
206 Id. at para. 9.
207 See Mundis, supra note 196, at 759.
208 Expert Report, supra note 18, at paras. 17, 20.

209 Id. at para. 35.
210 Id.at para. 29.
211 Id. at § IV ("The Tribunals").
212 Id. at para. 29.
213 Mundis, supra note 196, at 770.
214The 1999 budgetary appropriations percentage can be found under paragraph 179 of the Expert
Report. According to the chart, the Prosecution for the ICTY receives 28.5% of the budget, second to
the Registry's 68.7%. The Expert Report notes that the OIP has a total budgeted staff of 346 and a va-

cancy rate of approximately 13%. This organ is divided into the Investigations Division and the Prosecution Division.
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sonable doubt with regard to the statutory crimes, the Prosecutor's heavy
burden of proof, relentless defense tactics, and noncooperation of States
with regard to prosecutorial preparation all engender significant drains on
OIP resources. 215 The overwhelming bulk of this expenditure goes to investigations. 2 6 Significantly, the Expert Report praised the OIP's programs of

selective discrimination with regard to investigations, and the concentration
on prosecuting high-level officials. "As far as the Expert Group is able to
judge, optimum use is made by the latter [OIP] of its well-trained and experienced investigation personnel, attorneys and support staff, again given
the constraints under which they function. '2 7 By focusing on high-level
perpetrators, the OIP most effectively communicates the ICTY message

within the international theater because "[d]evoting huge resources to the
prosecution of 'small fry' while vindicating the wholly understandable and
justified emotions of individuals and families victimized by atrocities would
leave major goals largely unattained. ' '218 Insofar as this policy relates to
NATO, to say that NATO did not violate the laws of war might be wrong.
However, to divert finite resources toward investigating NATO's reckless
conduct and military errors in pursuance of an otherwise legally calculated
mission, and away from gross human rights violations like ethnic cleansing,2t 9 would defeat the purpose of the ICTY.
Division had 110 members, with ten people assigned to each team. G. Anthony Wolusky, Prosecuting
War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 6 U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. J.LEGAL STUD. 287, 290 (1995). This
Division appears to have grown, such that by 1999, "182 posts have been budgeted ... but 23 remain
vacant." Expert Report, supranote 18, at para. 114. The Expert Report also remarks:
In terms of total numbers, it is notable that, in comparison with national investigative and prosecutorial entities, whose missions are similar or even narrower in scope, the staff of the ICTY, though
far smaller, has nevertheless been able to achieve remarkable investigative and prosecutorial coverage in respect of a relatively large number of individual targets in a broad Balkan geographical
area.
Id. at para. 113.
215Expert Report, supra note 18, at paras. 61, 65, 143. The Expert Report maps three aspects peculiar to compiling a case in this type of international investigation:
(a) the lapse of time (at least two years and often more in some areas) between the commission of
crimes and the investigations, which poses special forensic and other evidence gathering problems;
(b) the exacting nature of and different types of proof required, while the jurisprudence of Tribunals was developing, to establish the complex details comprising crimes proscribed by the Statutes; (c) the difficulties associated with the numerous facets of military and political leadership
analysis needed to achieve understanding and proof of relationships between levels of authority.
Id. at para. 53.
216See Mundis, supra note 196, at 768-69.
217Expert Report, supranote 19, at para. 261.
218 Id.at para. 96; see also Wald, supra note 196, at 96 ("[Those accused] "are the senior officials
who allegedly drew up the plans, strategies, and campaigns to achieve the vicious ends they had come to
believe were legitimate state activities.").
219THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 76, at 88. According to this Independent International Commission endorsed by the United Nations:
There is widespread agreement that FRY forces were engaged in a well-planned campaign of terror and expulsion of the Kosovar Albanians. This campaign is most frequently described as one of
"ethnic cleansing," intended to drive many, if not all, Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo, destroy the
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Perhaps the most cumbersome onus with which the OIP must cope is
the massive evidentiary and legal burden-of-proof needed to convict under
the developing and, consequently, vague ICTY statutory standards. Because of nascent and evolving judicial guidelines for what is necessary to
obtain a conviction, the Prosecutor must indict individuals for as many
crimes as possible and present an oppressive amount of evidence and wit22 0

ness testimony-all of which considerably exhaust 'valuable resources.
Nor is the investigatory work completed by the start of the trial. 22' The

structure of the ICTY proceedings and human rights law in general (e.g.,
presumption of innocence, non self-incrimination) necessarily requires the
Prosecutor to prove every element of the crime against an uncooperative
accused, usually resulting in protracted and extensive investigations even

after the start of the trial. 222 Moreover, this type of ex post evidence gathering tends to lead to the amending of indictments, further delaying the pro-

ceedings.

223

The critical takeaway is that the OIP must conduct a somewhat unfocused, yet painstaking and comprehensive investigation before it can bring
an indictment. 2 4 As the Expert Report comments, "[t]he goal of an investigations staff, once it has established that serious crimes have occurred ... is
to develop the evidence needed for the indictment and successful prosecution of those responsible . . . . Criminal prosecution can founder on the
shoals of improper or slipshod investigation. ''225 Single investigations fre-

quently involve fieldwork spanning up to ten or more different countries,
many of which present hostile environments still in the midst of conflict, as
22 6
well as hundreds of witnesses.

foundations of their society, and prevent them from returning.
Id. (footnote omitted).
220 Expert Report, supra note 18, at para 65. The Expert Report notes that the Prosecutor has no
choice but to implement this type of approach to obtaining a conviction.
In the absence of authoritative guidance from the Appeals Chamber enabling the prosecution to
reduce the size of its case, without feeling that it will be found to have failed to sustain its burden
of proof, it is very difficult to fault the prosecution's position. And this, of course, has a significant bearing on the optimum use of prosecution counsel and support staff ....
The investigator
[in a national criminal justice system] carries out his functions against the background of wellsettled and familiar rules of criminal law, criminal procedure and evidence. There is usually not
much difficulty in knowing what facts or objects are of legal relevance. Such a well-defined environment does not exist in relation to the ICTY ....
Id. at paras. 65, 143.
221 Mundis, supra note 196, at 769.
222 Expert Report, supranote 18, at para. 67.
223 Id. at para. 127.
224 Wald, supranote 196, at 100-01.
225 Expert Report, supranote 18, at paras. 124, 126.
226Id. at paras. 126, 133; see also id. at para. 133 tbl. I (presenting investigative work underlying selected ICTY indictments). For example, the Tadic and Borovnica investigations dealt with eight countries, the Foca investigation dealt with fourteen countries, and the "Celibici" investigation spanned ten
countries. Id.
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The largest obstacle with regard to OIP investigations and arrests is the
lack of State cooperation. 227 Although the ICTY Statute contemplates total
State cooperation, the political reality of the Tribunal's work has not only severely discouraged State participation. 228 States can actively "hinder the
work of the Tribunal by discouraging witnesses from coming forward or passively failing to enforce ICTY summonses, subpoenas, or requests for information. '229 In addition, as the Expert Report found, "the Prosecutor 230
is
powerless when it is a question of obtaining custody [of the accused].
Because of this sort of State hindrance, the OIP has become dependent on
outside peacekeeping forces for evidence-gathering missions and executions
of arrest warrants. 231 By far the most incisive aspect of this dependence
within the polemic concerning the OIP decision not to pursue an investigation
into NATO is the fact that the peacekeeping operation that aids the OIP,
called the SFOR, is comprised of NATO forces.232 The Expert Report unambiguously states: "[S]earch warrants are of no avail in Croatia or the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, where there is no NATO force to provide security
for the execution of such a warrant. '23 3 In a very real sense, if the OIP had
decided to undertake an investigation into the NATO campaign it would have
been biting the hand that feeds it.2 34 Such action would hazard the loss of indispensable aid in obtaining evidence against, and custody over, accused war
crimes violators who had flagrantly pursued atrocities well above and beyond
227 Id. at paras. 143, 158.
228 Id. at para. 144.
229 Wald, supra note 196, at 114. Judge Wald astutely notes:
Sharply contrasting with Nuremberg and Tokyo, which followed unconditional surrender of
Germany and Japan, is the context in which the Tribunal was created and still operates. The Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnia war was a political compromise that left many of the perpetrators of war crimes still in power and many of the victims homeless and without a country.
Id.at 116.
230 Expert Report, supranote 18, at para. 158.
231 See Wolusky, supra note 214, at 295-97; see also Expert Report, supra note 18, at paras. 14345; Wald, supra note 196, at 114.
232 Wald, supra note 196, at 88; Wolusky, supra note 214, at 297 ("This massive military force
would seem to be the ideal 'law-enforcer.' With the geographic area of responsibilities assigned to the
various NATO members (including the United States), comes the possibility that the NATO forces will
encounter indicted war criminals and that they will also come across evidence of atrocities committed
during the war.").
233 Expert Report, supranote 18, at para. 144.
234 Another area of political tension for the OIP with regard to investigations might surface in relation to the role of the ICTY Registry. The OIP is financially dependent on the Registry such that the
OIP does not have "administrative responsibility with regard to its own budget, its staff, including language staff and public information, and the care and protection of its potential witnesses during investigations and also, if necessary, while trials are in progress ... under national judicial practice it would
probably be questionable that, as is the case in ICTY, the Office of the Prosecutor and her entire staff
physically be located in the same building and in such close proximity to the offices of the Chambers."
Id. at para. 133. The issue of whether the Registry influences OIP investigation choices has not been
explored, but one could imagine such a relationship.
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whatever NATO had done through its recklessness.23 5 It is understandable that

the OIP chose not to follow a course of action that might have resulted in
NATO forces aiding and enabling field investigations of NATO forcesindeed, it is difficult to imagine how such investigations would have proceeded.
B. The ICTY and OIP as UnitedStates and NATO Political Tools
The ICTY and the OIP have been criticized on the grounds that that the

Prosecutor restrained herself from pursuing an investigation into NATO
conduct for purely political reasons. 236 This criticism alleges that the bombing campaign and subsequent foundation of the ICTY were wholly motivated by NATO and U.S. foreign policy interests, 237 and that the OIP was

simply a political tool because "the U.S. championed the creation of the
Tribunal, and NATO countries supply the staff and evidence."2 38 The argument points to the influence of United States Secretary of State during
the campaign, Madeleine Albright, who had played a key role in establishing the Tribunal and had even appointed Ms. Del Ponte's predecessor in the
OIP, Louise Arbour. 239 Albright had been central to the decision to bomb
Kosovo and had also announced that the 0United States was the major pro24
vider of funds to key ICTY indictments.
These criticisms do not appear to be entirely baseless in the sense that
NATO members did not seem to take seriously the possibility of an investi-

gation or indictment. When asked at a NATO press conference about
charges being brought against the alliance, NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea
235 See THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 76, at 90, 180.
236 See JUDAH, supra note 35, at 280; Stephen Gowans, Genocide or Veracicide: Will NA TO's Lying Ever Stop?, SWANS COMMENTARY, July 23, 2001, at http://www.swans.com/library/art7/
gowans02.html; Letter from Michael Mandel, Professor, to Justice Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Mar.
15,
2000), at
http://www.geocities.com/cpablacktown/20000318warcrmande.htm; Letter from Milosh Milenkovich,
President, Serbian Unity Congress, to Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Jan. 12, 2000), at http://news.serbianunity.net/press/suc206.html; see
also Majorie Cohn, Pacificationfor a Pipeline: Explaining the U.S. Military Presence in the Balkans
(explaining that "the bombing was actually part of a strategy of containment, to keep the region safe for
the Trans-Balkan oil pipeline that will transport Caspian oil through Macedonia and Albania"), at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew22.htm.
237 JUDAH, supra note 35, at 231. According to senior foreign ministry official, Milisav Pajic, the
official Yugoslav view of why NATO went to war is as follows:
"I don't think Kosovo and Metohija was the real goal. It was to oppose the leadership of this
country and introduce NATO here. It was a sort of ideological jihad. We did not want to accept
the military occupation of this country and the legal basis for the separation of Kosovo ....The
Americans prevented an agreement. They were looking for excuses because their intention was to
bomb Yugoslavia. Their plans were ready but an excuse was needed."
Id. (quoting senior foreign ministry official Milisav Pajic).
238 Gowans, supra note 236.
239 Id.
240 Professor Michael Mandel to the Canadian House of Commons (pt. 2), Feb. 22, 2000; see also
Gowans, supranote 236 (recounting how Albright is known as "the mother" of the Tribunal to its staff).
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implicitly discounted the prospect by stating: "As you know, without
NATO countries there would be no ... International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia because NATO countries are in the forefront of those who
have established these tribunals, who fund these tribunals, and who support
on a daily basis their activities. '241 Along these lines, Lester Munson of the
U.S. International Relations Committee responded to inquiries about possible OIP investigations into NATO conduct by stating: "You're more likely
to see the U.N. building dismantled brick-by-brick and thrown into the Atlantic than to see NATO pilots go before a U.N. Tribunal. '242 Such statements would seem to reinforce the charges of the Yugoslav ambassador to
the U.N., Vladislav Jovanovic, that the United Nations Security Council
would prefer to "'sink its head in the sand' and pretend not to see the real
picture in Kosovo ....

The real control ...

did not belong to the United

Nations and Security Council but to one outside Power-the United
243
States."

The OIP should have taken the opportunity to adequately address these
claims in the Final Report. Instead, it appointed an ex-NATO lawyer, William Fenrick, to write up and issue what came across as a disappointingly
unconvincing rationale for the OIP decision. 244 Although the international
prominence of the United States and the NATO alliance is undeniable, it is
most likely a stretch to accuse these world players of having initiated and
funded an international tribunal solely to serve their own political ends. 245
A more realistic perspective is that the ICTY was, in many ways, dependent
on United States and NATO funding and resources 4 6 -and this is where
politics influenced the OIP. That is, it would have been difficult for the
OIP to justify investigating and prosecuting those who provided its funding
241 NATO Press Conference, Brussels (May 17, 1999).
242 Jan Cienski & Joel-Denis Bellavance, We'll Never Hand Pilots to Arbour: U.S. Official Disbelief in Congress, NAT'L POST (Canada), available at http://www.balkanpeace.org/library/spin/
disbelief.html.
243 United Nations Press Conference by Permanent Mission of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
(Aug. 22, 2000).
244 Gowans, supra note 236; see supra Part IV. According to this author's opinion, Fenrick probably should have recused himself from the whole ordeal.
245 If U.S. and NATO self-interest was the sole factor in setting up the tribunal, it is unclear what
political end the tribunal served which would not have been served simply by NATO bombing and putting an end to the Serb aggression. First, in the absence of the tribunal, NATO and U.S. action would
have come under much less scrutiny from the global community and the United Nations. The mere
presence of an active international criminal tribunal effectuates large-scale international observation and
evaluation of the events at issue which may not be present otherwise. A lower level of international
scrutiny would have allowed the U.S. and NATO to pursue interests more rigorously without having to
ensure (as much) compliance with international law. Second, the creation of an international tribunal
occurs at a significant fiscal and diplomatic cost to the U.S. and NATO countries. If the U.S could have
achieved what it wanted (the end of Serb aggression) by military intervention alone, it would seem
strange to spend resources to set up a criminal tribunal that would have the function of publicizing and
potentially adjudicating U.S. action as well.
246 See Wald, supra note 196, at 88, 114; Wolusky, supranote 214, at 296-97.
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and enforcement capabilities while letting much more serious war criminals
off the hook, especially where NATO conducted its campaign with an247unprecedented eye toward protecting civilian life under international law.
VI. CONCLUSION

The OIP did not adequately apply established norms of international
law concerning protection against collateral damage to the NATO bombing
campaign. The result was a weak and unconvincing legal justification for
not pursuing an investigation into NATO conduct. However, below the surface there may have existed a valid rationale not to pursue an investigation
founded on judicial resource allocation. While it might be hard to deny that
the ICTY dependence on NATO and the United States engendered inextricable political influences within the working of the Tribunal and the OIP,
regardless of these influences, the OIP made the right decision under the
circumstances not to investigate NATO conduct. Such an investigation
would have emptied limited resources to pursue reckless incidents in an
the Proseotherwise legally calculated campaign, and would have restricted
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Reliance on this practical resource argument would have allowed for
the possibility that violations such as those committed by NATO could be
prosecuted in the future practice of international tribunals if such tribunals
had adequate resources, thus advancing the doctrine of protection of civilian
life in armed conflict. This resource justification would have limited the
OIP decision to the particular circumstances of the ICTY. In this way, the
OIP could have remained faithful to the normative humanitarian mandate of
preservation of innocent life without doctrinally modifying the threshold for
pursuing investigations where the economic and political reality of a future
tribunal may differ from that of the ICTY.

247 Author's interview with Joe Klein, during which Mr. Klein commented on interview with United

States General Wesley Clark, October 11, 2001.
248 The Author would like to note, that even though the O[P took the correct course of action in this
situation, NATO war crimes are still blameworthy. In the words of Howard Zinn:

[W]e have heard [NATO] pass off the bombing of Yugoslav civilians by telling us the Serb police
have killed more than we have, so it's okay to bomb not just Serbs but Albanian refugees, not just
adults but children .... There were those who defended the 1945 firestorm bombing of Dresden
(100,000 dead?-we can't be sure) by pointing to the Holocaust. As if one atrocity deserves another. And with no chance at all that one could prevent the other. I have heard the deaths of several hundred thousand Japanese citizens in the atomic strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki justified

by the terrible acts of the Japanese military in that war. I suppose if we consider the millions of
casualties of all the wars started by national leaders these past fifty years ... some righteous God
might well annihilate the human race.
Howard Zinn, Their Atrocities-And Ours, PROGRESSIVE, July 1999, available at http://www.pro
gressive.org/zinn9907.htm.
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